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ABSTRACT
Southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
have many fiscal challenges in common with 
other emerging market and mature economies 
concerning deficit and debt reduction and the 
maintenance of fiscal discipline. However, 
most countries in the region also face some 
specific fiscal issues, such as relatively high 
public debt, dependence on some form or 
another of donor dependence or concessional 
financing, high budgetary exposure to 
fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices, high defence 
expenditure and weak tax bases. Against this 
background, this paper reviews fiscal 
developments and fiscal policy issues in the ten 
countries that are participants or observers in 
the EU’s Barcelona process. The main focus is 
on the implications of these developments and 
issues for macroeconomic stability, given that 
countries in the region have made considerable 
progress in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation 
over the last two decades, which is reflected in 
particular in lower inflation rates. The analysis 
distinguishes between non-oil-producing and 
oil-producing countries in the region, as they 
exhibit different fiscal features and are 
confronted with different challenges. In the 
case of non-oil-producing countries, the key 
challenges stem from high deficits and debt 
levels, including implicit and contingent 
liabilities, notwithstanding some progress in 
fiscal consolidation in most of these countries 
over the last years. In the case of oil-producing 
countries, whose fiscal situation has significantly 
improved in recent years in the wake of high oil 
prices, the key challenges for fiscal management 
stem from the heavy reliance on an exhaustible 
source of revenues and a large exposure to 
fluctuations in international hydrocarbon 
prices. A shock originating from – or being 
transmitted via and exacerbated by – the fiscal 
sector appears to be the single most important 
macroeconomic risk in many countries.  5
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This paper reviews fiscal developments and 
fiscal policy issues in Mediterranean countries.1 
Fiscal policy is a crucial factor in determining 
a country’s overall economic performance via 
its effects on allocation, stabilisation and 
distribution, and constitutes a key component 
of macroeconomic policies alongside monetary 
and exchange rate policy. There are at least two 
reasons why fiscal developments are of great 
relevance for central banks: (i) governments 
may resort to the central bank for the financing 
of public deficits rather than borrowing in 
capital markets. This is more likely the less 
developed the domestic capital markets, the 
more severe the impediments and disruptions in 
accessing international capital markets and the 
less independent central banks are, and thus 
appears particularly relevant for developing 
and emerging market economies; (ii) even in 
the absence of monetary financing, fiscal policy 
can have a large impact on the economy via its 
effects on interest rates, the exchange rate and 
aggregate demand, as well as on expectations, 
in particular as regards the sustainability of 
public debt. Perceptions of the sustainability of 
fiscal policy can have an impact on financial 
markets and, if they are negative, can interfere 
with the objectives of monetary and exchange 
rate policy, such as achieving and preserving 
price stability, financial stability or maintaining 
an exchange rate peg. In the extreme case, fiscal 
dominance of monetary policy can lead to a 
situation in which the central bank is no longer 
able to effectively use its instruments in order 
to achieve its objectives.
As a result, central banks in advanced and 
emerging market economies closely monitor 
fiscal developments. In many cases, they 
also publicly voice their opinion on fiscal 
policy issues even if these issues are not directly 
in the realm of central banking activities. 
Mediterranean economies have many features 
in common with other emerging market 
economies, such as a high exposure to real 
economy and financial shocks and susceptibility 
to financing constraints, but also exhibit a 
1  Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza. These are the participants 
or observers (Libya) in the EU’s Barcelona process. 
number of specific fiscal issues and challenges. 
Although Mediterranean economies appear 
largely heterogeneous, including on fiscal 
issues, some challenges are common to most of 
the countries in this region. These include 
relatively high public debt, dependence on some 
form or another of donor support or concessional 
financing, high defence expenditure and weak 
tax bases. In addition, in most countries there is 
room to improve public finance management 
in order to achieve better fiscal outcomes. 
Notwithstanding progress in many countries, 
fiscal vulnerabilities appear as key risks to 
maintaining macroeconomic and financial 
stability in the region, and create a challenging 
environment for central banks. Against this 
background, the role of fiscal policy in 
Mediterranean countries’ macroeconomic 
frameworks was discussed at the fourth High-
Level Eurosystem Seminar with Mediterranean 
countries’ central banks on 28 March 2007 in 
Valencia, Spain, for which an earlier version of 
this paper was prepared.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
reviews developments in key fiscal indicators 
in Mediterranean countries from a long-term 
perspective. Section 3 examines the structure of 
the budget on the revenue and the expenditure 
side and identifies the main features. Section 4 
highlights important fiscal policy issues and 
their implications for monetary and exchange 
rate policy. Section 5 concludes. While the 
paper takes a horizontal view of fiscal issues 
across the region, a summary of key fiscal 
characteristics and challenges on a country-by-
country basis is given in the Annex.6
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2  DEVELOPMENT OF KEY FISCAL INDICATORS: 
A LONG-TERM VIEW
In order to assess Mediterranean countries’ 
current fiscal policy issues and challenges, it is 
useful to look at the longer-term developments 
in key fiscal indicators, so as to put them into 
perspective. To this end, this section reviews 
the development of government balances, debt, 
expenditure and revenue (all as a percentage of 
GDP) over the past two decades. It compares 
developments in Mediterranean countries with 
those in ten new EU Member States,2 in EU 
candidate and potential candidate countries3  
and in developing countries.4 While any 
benchmark is to some extent imperfect and 
subject to many caveats, comparing 
Mediterranean countries with new EU Member 
States and EU candidate and potential candidate 
countries is relevant as these countries are 
geographically close to the euro area and are 
often seen as competing for financial flows and 
FDI from the euro area. In addition, like the 
new EU Member States and EU candidate and 
potential candidate countries, Mediterranean 
countries have a history of state intervention in 
the economy.5 Developing countries as a whole 
constitute a broader benchmark, and comprise 
many economies with income levels comparable 
to Mediterranean countries.
The review of fiscal developments in this 
section distinguishes between oil-producing 
countries in the Mediterranean region – Algeria, 
Libya and to a lesser extent Syria – and non-oil-
producing countries – the other seven countries 
under review –, given that hydrocarbon (oil and 
gas) revenue is an important feature of fiscal 
developments.6
2.1 GENERAL  GOVERNMENT 
BALANCE-TO-GDP RATIO
The general government balance-to-GDP ratio 
of Mediterranean countries has on average 
improved from a long-term perspective (see 
Chart 1), although many countries continue to 
exhibit large deficits, in particular the non-oil-
producing countries of the region (see Table 1). 
The budget balance of the oil-producing 
countries has generally been in surplus since 
the beginning of this decade, with the exception 
of Syria. Deficits in the region were even more 
sizeable up to the early 1990s, when several 
countries embarked on a path of macroeconomic 
stabilisation, reducing both inflation and budget 
deficits, which often were at the root of 
inflationary pressures. The reduction of budget 
deficits was supported by higher real GDP 
growth in many countries in the first half of the 
1990s as compared with the late 1980s.7 
The shift of the early 1990s is also reflected 
in improving primary balances. Most 
Mediterranean countries have run primary 
surpluses in most of the years since the early 
1990s, in contrast to new EU Member States for 
example. After the deterioration observed in 
2001 and 2002 – mainly reflecting a worsening 
of budget balances in oil-producing countries 
in view of lower oil prices and the recession in 
Israel in the context of the second intifada – 
overall deficits tended to decline. 
The recent improvement is mainly explained by 
positive developments in the region’s oil-
2  Countries which joined the EU in 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. As most of these countries are transition 
economies, a comparison of data is only meaningful after the 
beginning of transition, i.e. from the early 1990s onwards. 
3 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR 
Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro and Turkey (Bulgaria 
and Romania joined the EU in 2007). As with the new EU 
Member States, a meaningful comparison of data is only 
possible for the period after 1990. Due to the small size of most 
countries, the weighted average of this group is heavily 
influenced by fiscal developments in Turkey.
4  This group comprises “Other emerging market and developing 
countries” as classified in the IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO). These comprise 146 countries, i.e. all IMF members 
except those 29 countries classified as advanced economies. 
Data for this group as a whole can only be traced back to 1990, 
and data on public debt are not available.
5  While none of the Mediterranean countries was a fully-fledged 
centrally planned economy, many were characterised by a high 
degree of state intervention, public ownership of enterprises, 
underdeveloped private sectors and little reliance on market 
mechanisms. 
6  Egypt also produces oil and gas and has relied on hydrocarbon 
revenues, but the importance of hydrocarbons for the budget, 
exports and GDP is comparatively smaller. Thus, it is grouped 
in this paper as a non-oil-producing country.
7  Average real GDP growth for nine of the ten countries under 
review (excluding the West Bank and Gaza) was 1.9% on 
average p.a. in the years 1986-90, while it stood at 3.9% in the 
period 1991-95.7
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producing countries, most notably in Algeria and 
Libya, which have accumulated large fiscal 
surpluses in the wake of higher oil prices.8 This 
also explains why the fiscal balance for 
Mediterranean countries as a group currently 
looks more favourable than the one of new EU 
Member States, EU candidate and potential 
candidate countries and developing countries. 
Some non-oil-producing Mediterranean countries 
were also able to reduce deficits through 
consolidation efforts, supported by relatively 
strong global and regional growth. Nevertheless, 
in many countries fiscal deficits remain 
persistently high, in particular in Egypt and 
Lebanon, pointing to the pressing need for more 
active fiscal consolidation efforts. Furthermore, 
the official deficit figures include foreign grants 
and the budgetary situation of several Eastern 
Mediterranean countries would be even more 
precarious without the different forms of donor 
support. In some cases, donor support has 
amounted to around 10% of GDP over the last 
years. 
Overall, cyclical developments – in terms of 
real GDP growth and in the case of oil producers 
oil prices – have played a prominent role in 
Mediterranean countries’ fiscal balances. 
However, the fact that substantial overall 
deficits persist in many countries even in view 
of relatively robust global and regional growth 
of recent years points to underlying fiscal 
problems. Thus fiscal imbalances do not seem 
to be just a symptom of broader economic 
problems, e.g. a weakness of economic growth, 
even though the growth performance of 
Mediterranean countries over the past decades 
is inferior to that of other emerging market 
economies, for example in Asia.
2.2   PUBLIC DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO
While public debt-to-GDP ratios have somewhat 
declined, on average, since 19909 (see Chart 2), 
many countries remain highly indebted, which 
creates significant vulnerabilities (see Table 2). 
Public debt continuously declined in oil-
producing countries over the last years; 
8  Notwithstanding significant fiscal surpluses, Algeria and Libya 
exhibit large non-oil deficit/non-oil GDP ratios, which are a 
better indicator of the fiscal stance in oil-producing countries 
than the overall budget balance-to-GDP ratio (see also Sub-
section 4.3). Algeria’s non-oil deficit/non-oil GDP ratio 
increased from 27.7% in 2003 to 35.3% in 2005, while that of 
Libya rose from 80.3% to 118.4% over the same period, pointing 
to expansionary fiscal policies in the two countries over recent 
years. The comparable ratio in Syria is lower at 15.3% (2005) 
and has declined since 2003. (Data from IMF Article IV 
reports.)
9  For earlier years, sufficient country data are not available.
Chart 1 General government balance
(percent of GDP)
Source: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Number of countries included in the average may vary 
according to data availability.
Chart 2 General government gross debt
(percent of GDP)
Source: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Number of countries included in the average may vary 
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however, on average it remains close to 100% 
of GDP in non-oil-producing countries. The 
public debt of Mediterranean countries is higher 
than in new EU Member States and EU candidate 
and potential candidate countries, reflecting 
fiscal profligacy over an extended period of 
time as well as external shocks. The decline of 
public debt in several countries, in particular in 
the early 1990s, is the result of both debt 
rescheduling (inter alia in the framework of the 
Paris Club) and macroeconomic stabilisation 
programmes. At present, three countries – 
Egypt, Israel and Lebanon – have debt-to-GDP 
ratios above or around 100%, while Jordan and 
Morocco also have debt levels well above 60% 
of GDP. Lebanon faces a particularly challenging 
situation, as public debt is not only very high at 
175% of GDP, but has also steadily increased in 
recent years. By contrast, the region’s major 
oil-producing countries, Algeria and Libya, 
Table 1 General government balance
(percent of GDP)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Non-oil-producing countries
 Egypt -22.0 -12.6 -1.3 -1.2 -2.2 -9.2 -9.0 -8.3 -9.1
 Israel 1.0 -4.8 -4.2 -2.0 -4.0 -4.3 -6.7 -5.1 -2.7
 Jordan -8.3 -6.2 -3.9 -4.7 -3.6 -4.9 -1.0 -1.7 -5.2
 Lebanon -35.8 -29.8 -18.0 -24.2 -18.5 -14.1 -13.2 -8.5 -8.0
 Morocco -7.7 -0.6 -5.5 -5.9 -6.0 -4.4 -4.9 -4.3 -5.5
 Tunisia -5.4 -5.4 -4.2 -3.3 -2.7 -2.8 -3.1 -2.5 -3.0
  West Bank & Gaza ………… -8.4 -8.2 -7.4 -5.4 -8.8
 Non-oil  producers
 (average) -12.6 -8.4 -4.3 -3.6 -4.4 -6.4 -7.0 -5.6 -5.3
Oil-producing countries
 Algeria 1) 3.3 2.7 0.4 9.7 3.4 0.2 7.8 6.9 14.2
 Libya -13.4 1.3 4.2 14.4 -1.2 10.3 9.8 15.1 32.2
 Syria -13.9 -3.9 -3.8 -1.4 2.3 -2.0 -2.6 -4.3 -4.2
  Oil producers (average) -4.2 1.3 0.9 9.2 1.8 1.7 6.2 6.7 15.7
Mediterranean -8.3 -5.4 -2.8 -0.2 -2.7 -4.3 -3.4 -1.8 1.6
Memorandum items:
New Member States ... ... -2.6 -3.3 -4.2 -5.5 -5.0 -4.7 -3.7
  (number of countries in
  average, max. 10) ... ... (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Candidate and potential 
candidate countries
... ... -5.2 -11.2 -14.3 -12.8 -9.3 -5.6 -4.3
  (number of countries in
  average, max. 8) ... ... (7) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8)
Developing countries -3.6 -3.5 -3.5 -3.9 -4.3 -3.4 -2.1 -1.4
Source: IMF. 
Notes: Averages weighted by nominal GDP in US dollars; due to data comparability problems, West Bank & Gaza is not included in 
the average. 
1) Central government.
have used part of the windfall profits resulting 
from high oil prices to repay public debt, which 
now appears very low. They are the only 
countries of the region for which public 
indebtedness is no longer a major issue. 
The structure of public debt differs among 
Mediterranean countries. The vulnerability 
resulting from high debt, for example in Egypt 
and Israel, is somewhat mitigated by the fact 
that a large part of debt is domestic, long-term 
and partially non-tradable, while some countries 
have a significant external debt or debt with 
shorter maturities.10 As a result of relatively 
high public debt, interest expenditure is a 
significant burden for most Mediterranean 
countries’ budgets. Interest expenditure makes 
up around 4% of GDP on average, down from 
10  See Box 3 in Section 4 on the structure of public debt.9
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Table 2 General government gross debt
(percent of GDP)
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Non-oil-producing countries
 Egypt 100.0 60.3 75.4 83.2 97.7 111.4 109.9 112.5
 Israel 134.7 104.5 87.0 92.1 99.8 102.3 100.9 97.0
 Jordan 1) 212.2 114.9 90.9 94.9 97.0 97.7 88.5 82.3
 Lebanon 98.4 78.5 151.1 165.9 166.4 167.8 164.7 174.6
 Morocco 89.1 90.6 80.8 74.7 71.3 68.9 65.8 70.5
 Tunisia … 58.5 60.7 62.7 61.5 61.0 57.6 56.9
  West Bank & Gaza … …………………
 Non-oil  producers
 (average) 111.8 85.8 84.4 89.6 97.0 100.6 97.5 98.0
Oil-producing countries
 Algeria 2) … 116.2 69.4 63.0 53.5 43.8 36.6 28.5
 Libya 77.8 79.4 48.0 46.2 33.7 27.4 1.6 1.2
 Syria 73.7 71.1 59.3 60.2 60.1 61.9 57.0 60.2
  Oil producers (average) 76.6 95.1 60.6 57.4 51.1 43.9 32.6 26.9
Mediterranean 105.2 88.5 78.1 81.1 85.0 84.9 77.5 74.5
Memorandum items:
New Member States ... 42.7 35.5 36.2 38.8 41.8 41.5 41.8
  (number of countries in
  average, max. 10) ... (7) (9) (9) (9) (9) (9) (9)
Candidate and potential 
candidate countries
... 43.5 60.7 81.7 73.8 66.5 62.2 57.4
  (number of countries in
  average, max. 8) ... (3) (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) (6)
Source: IMF.
Note: Averages weighted by nominal GDP in US dollars. 
1) Net debt.
2) Central government.
above 6% before 1990. However, in highly 
indebted Lebanon, it still accounts for 10% of 
GDP despite the relief brought about by several 
rounds of international donor assistance.    
2.3 PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE-TO-GDP  RATIO
Public expenditure is relatively high in 
Mediterranean countries, although somewhat 
lower than in the late 1980s (see Chart 3). At 
36-40% of GDP in the aggregate over the last 
years, the level of expenditure seems comparable 
to those of new EU Member States and EU 
candidate and potential candidate countries. 
The latter have relatively high public spending 
reflecting the legacy of the socialist past, for 
example in the form of a large public service. 
Public expenditure in non-oil-producing 
countries of the region, at around 40% of GDP, 
is significantly higher than in oil-producing 
countries (around 30% of GDP). The average 
figures are driven up by two outliers, Israel and 
Libya, where public expenditure stands at 
around 50% and 40% of GDP, respectively (see 
Table 3). In most other countries, public 
expenditure accounts for 30% to 35% of GDP. 
However, even this level is well above the 
average for developing countries, where public 
expenditure accounts for slightly more than 
25% of GDP. 
Factors contributing to high expenditure levels 
are inter alia defence outlays (in Eastern 
Mediterranean countries) reflecting political 
tensions in the region, interest expenditure 
stemming from high debt (which partly explains 
the higher level of expenditure in non-oil-
producing countries compared with oil-
producing countries), energy subsidies, and 
expenditure on wages and salaries, partly 
attributable to attempts by governments to 
address high unemployment by job creation in 
2 DEVELOPMENT 
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the public sector.11 The large government 
sectors in Mediterranean (and other Middle 
Eastern) countries have repeatedly been 
identified as one of the factors explaining the 
disappointing growth performance of the region 
as compared with other emerging market 
economies.12
2.4  PUBLIC REVENUE-TO-GDP RATIO
Public revenue as a percentage of GDP has been 
broadly stable at around 35% over the last 
decades. The most recent increase to close to 
40% mainly reflects higher hydrocarbon 
revenue in oil-producing countries (Algeria and 
Libya and to a lesser extent Syria). For these 
Table 3 General government expenditure
(percent of GDP)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Non-oil-producing countries
 Egypt 56.8 32.9 28.6 29.9 30.4 34.6 35.2 33.8 33.9
 Israel 67.7 57.5 54.4 50.2 52.7 54.1 53.0 51.2 49.1
 Jordan 37.3 42.9 38.3 34.7 33.9 34.5 35.8 38.4 38.2
 Lebanon 53.9 39.4 35.2 43.5 36.7 35.1 35.2 31.3 30.2
 Morocco 30.3 27.5 29.5 32.1 31.1 29.4 29.6 29.9 33.1
 Tunisia 38.8 36.8 34.4 32.7 32.5 33.1 32.8 32.5 32.9
  West Bank & Gaza ………… 29.9 32.4 35.6 37.4 42.4
 Non-oil  producers
 (average) 54.0 39.9 40.7 39.5 40.1 41.4 41.1 39.9 39.5
Oil-producing countries
 Algeria 1) 34.0 26.2 29.5 28.6 31.3 35.0 29.2 29.3 26.9
 Libya 47.5 35.1 30.2 31.3 44.3 41.2 44.6 44.0 41.6
 Syria 41.2 28.3 29.8 27.4 28.0 28.5 31.4 31.9 30.7
  Oil producers (average) 38.8 29.4 29.8 29.3 34.5 34.8 32.8 32.9 31.1
Mediterranean 46.1 36.6 37.6 36.7 38.6 39.7 38.8 37.7 36.6
Memorandum items:
New Member States ... ... 41.9 40.9 41.9 43.2 43.7 43.3 43.3
  (number of countries in
  average, max. 10) ... ... (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Candidate and potential 
candidate countries
... ... 29.2 41.4 46.0 43.4 46.3 41.6 40.5
  (number of countries in
  average, max. 8) ... ... (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7)
Developing countries ... 29.8 25.2 26.3 27.2 27.7 27.2 26.4 26.6
Source: IMF.
Notes: Averages weighted by nominal GDP in US dollars; due to data comparability problems, West Bank & Gaza is not included in 
the average. Includes net lending (lending minus repayment for purposes of public policy).
1) Central government.
11  See Section 3 for a more detailed analysis of public expenditure 
and revenue.
12  See for example Abed and Davoodi (2003) and Hakura (2004).
Chart 3 General government expenditure
(percent of GDP)
Source: IMF and ECB calculations.
Notes: Number of countries included in the average may vary 
according to data availability. Includes net lending (lending 
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Table 4 General government revenue
(percent of GDP)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Non-oil-producing countries
 Egypt 34.8 20.3 27.3 28.7 28.2 25.4 26.2 25.6 24.8
 Israel 68.7 52.7 50.2 48.3 48.8 49.8 46.3 46.1 46.4
 Jordan 29.0 36.7 34.4 30.0 30.3 29.6 34.7 36.7 33.0
 Lebanon 18.1 9.7 17.2 19.3 18.2 21.0 22.0 22.8 22.3
 Morocco 22.6 26.9 24.0 26.2 25.1 25.0 24.7 25.6 27.6
 Tunisia 33.4 31.4 30.2 29.4 29.8 30.3 29.7 30.0 29.9
  West Bank & Gaza ………… 7 . 3 9 . 4 21.0 23.4 25.7
  Non-oil producers (average) 41.4 31.1 33.2 33.4 33.2 32.3 31.9 31.9 31.6
Oil-producing countries
 Algeria 1) 37.2 28.9 30.0 38.3 34.7 35.3 37.0 36.2 41.1
 Libya 34.0 36.5 34.4 45.7 43.1 51.4 54.4 59.1 73.9
 Syria 27.3 24.3 25.9 26.0 30.3 26.5 28.8 27.6 26.5
  Oil producers (average) 34.5 29.9 30.3 37.8 36.0 37.6 39.8 40.3 46.6
Mediterranean 37.9 31.2 34.8 36.6 35.8 35.4 35.5 35.9 38.3
Memorandum items:
New Member States ... ... 39.3 37.7 37.7 37.7 38.7 38.5 39.7
  (number of countries in
  average, max. 10) ... ... (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Candidate and potential 
candidate countries
... ... 24.1 29.8 31.1 30.2 36.7 35.8 36.0
  (number of countries in
  average, max. 8) ... ... (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7)
Developing countries ... 26.2 21.7 22.8 23.3 23.4 23.8 24.3 25.2
Source: IMF.
Notes: Averages weighted by nominal GDP in US dollars; due to data comparability problems, West Bank & Gaza is not included in 
the average. Includes grants from abroad.
1) Central government.
countries hydrocarbon revenues are by far the 
most important source of income, which 
distinguishes their budgetary structure and 
fiscal developments from other Mediterranean 
countries (Section 3). In non-oil-producing 
countries, public revenue as a percentage of 
GDP is lower and relatively stable at 31-34%. 
The level of total revenue broadly mirrors 
public expenditure, and is thus similar to levels 
prevailing in new EU Member States and EU 
candidate and potential candidate countries, 
but higher than in developing countries (see 
Chart 4). As with expenditure, Israel and Libya 
appear as outliers, with 46% and 70% revenue-
to-GDP ratios respectively. This reflects high 
public expenditure and the existence of a 
developed tax system in Israel and high oil 
revenues in a non-diversified economy in the 
case of Libya. For most other countries the 
Chart 4 General government revenue
(percent of GDP)
Source: IMF and ECB calculations.
Notes: Number of countries included in the average may vary 
according to data availability. Includes grants from abroad.
Mediterranean
new Member States
candidate and potential candidate countries
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Table 5 Compliance with fiscal standards and data transparency
GDDS SDDS ROSC GFSM
(1986/2001)
Key findings on IMF Code on Fiscal Transparency (ROSC or Art. IV)
Algeria - - 2005 1) - Notwithstanding some improvements over recent years, major progress 
is needed to attain a satisfactory level of transparency in the fiscal sector. 
Quasi-fiscal activities of banks and public enterprises are still significant. 
Data mostly refer only to central government.
Egypt X 2005 2) 2001 Egypt is well on its way to subscribing to the SDDS and macroeconomic 
statistics are of reasonably good quality, but several issues remain, for 
example some quasi-fiscal activities of state-owned banks and public 
enterprises are not included in the scope of general government.
Israel X 2004 1) 2001 Israel meets the requirements of the fiscal transparency code in many 
areas. Improvements could be made in budgetary preparation, execution 
and expenditure classification. Israel’s macroeconomic statistics are of 
generally high quality. 
Jordan X 2006 1) 2001 Notwithstanding recent significant progress toward greater fiscal 
transparency, Jordan fails to meet several requirements of the fiscal 
transparency code, and a broad and sustained effort will be required. For 
example, the definition of government is not fully consistent with the 
GFS format and excludes many government activities.
Lebanon X 2005 1) 1986 Lebanon has made progress toward meeting the requirements of the fiscal 
transparency code in a few areas. In many other areas, however, Lebanon 
falls short of the requirements of the code. For example, there is no 
multi-year budget framework, significant extrabudgetary and quasi-fiscal 
activities remain, expenditure controls are overly complex and there is no 
external audit.
Libya - - - - The fiscal information system remains fragmented and inconsistent with 
international standards, since it was designed for administrative reporting 
rather than for purposes of providing timely statistical information for 
economic planning and analysis.
Morocco X 2005 1) 2001 Morocco’s fiscal management system is essentially reliable and adequate 
for steering budget performance. Thanks to reforms over recent years, 
fiscal transparency is, for the most part, ensured. Despite the generally 
satisfactory overall picture, progress in some areas is still needed to meet 
the transparency standards of international best practices, for example 
with regard to budget coverage and the evaluation of fiscal risks.
Syria - - - - Syria’s government finance statistics suffer from major deficiencies with 
respect to definitions, coverage, classification, methodology, accuracy, 
reliability and timeliness that generate severe inconsistencies with 
monetary and balance of payments statistics. Budget data are available 
with very long lags. The authorities have decided to participate in the 
GDDS.
Tunisia X 2006 2) 1986 The quality of macroeconomic statistics has improved over the past 
decade, and is broadly adequate for analysis and policy design and 
monitoring. Staff resources available for statistical work, especially for 
GFS, are not fully adequate, and statistics follow methodologies, which 
in most areas need to be updated.
West Bank
and Gaza X- - -
Source: IMF. Information as at mid-2006.
GDDS: General Data Dissemination System; SDDS: Special Data Dissemination Standard; ROSC: Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes. 
GFSM 1986: A Manual on Government Finance Statistics 1986; GFSM 2001: Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001; GFS: 
Government Finance Statistics.
1) ROSC Fiscal Transparency Module.
2) ROSC Data Module.
public revenue-to-GDP ratio stands at around 
25-30% (see Table 4). Lebanon stands out as 
the country with the lowest revenue in the 
region, pointing to difficulties in generating 
sufficient revenue to cover public expenditure, 
which is one of the reasons for the country’s 
high deficits over the last years and the 
accumulation of public debt. 13
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2.5 FISCAL  TRANSPARENCY  AND  DATA  QUALITY
A key issue to be taken into account when 
looking at fiscal data in the Mediterranean 
region is the relatively low compliance with 
fiscal standards and the unsatisfactory level of 
transparency (see Table 5). Notwithstanding 
improvements over recent years, in many 
countries the quality of fiscal (and other 
economic) statistics is not in line with 
international standards and does not allow for 
in-depth macroeconomic and fiscal analysis. 
For example, cyclically adjusted budget deficits 
to analyse the underlying fiscal stance are not 
available. In some countries, transparency is in 
particular hampered by limited statistical 
coverage of government activities, and thus 
implies the existence of significant quasi-fiscal 
activities and contingent liabilities. In general, 
the non-oil-producing countries in the region 
have better fiscal statistics than the oil 
producers. Only six countries, all of them non-
oil-producing, comply with the IMF fiscal 
reporting framework – the Government Finance 
Statistics Manual (GFSM).13 Only four countries 
comply with the Special Data Dissemination 
Standard (SDDS) and three with the (less 
demanding) General Data Dissemination 
System (GDDS). The contrast between oil- and 
non-oil-producing countries is again observable 
as Algeria, Libya and Syria comply neither with 
the SDDS nor with the GDDS. As regards fiscal 
transparency, most countries agreed that the 
IMF conducts a Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC), which contains a 
fiscal module. 
13  There are two versions of GFSM (1986 and 2001). The major 
difference is that reporting according to GFSM 1986 is cash-
based, while GFSM 2001 shifts the emphasis to accrual 
accounting. 
2 DEVELOPMENT 
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3  CURRENT BUDGETARY STRUCTURES OF 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
As already apparent from the previous section, 
Mediterranean countries are heterogeneous as 
regards key fiscal indicators. An important 
distinguishing feature is hydrocarbon revenue, 
grouping the region into oil-producing 
countries, particularly Algeria and Libya and 
to a lesser extent Syria, and non-oil-producing 
countries. Among non-oil-producing countries, 
Israel and especially the West Bank and Gaza 
appear as outliers with specific fiscal features: 
the former because of its higher GDP per capita, 
the latter because it is not a sovereign state (see 
Box 2).
Against this background, this section provides 
a closer look at the structures both on the 
revenue and the expenditure side of 
Mediterranean countries’ budgets, and identifies 
Table 6 Budgetary structure of non-oil-producing Mediterranean countries
Revenue Egypt Israel Lebanon Jordan Morocco Tunisia
(as % of GDP)
Tax revenues   ≈ 14 30   ≈ 14   ≈ 15 23 21
 Direct  taxation
    Taxes on income and profits ≈ 5 > 16 3 3 > 7 ≈ 7
  Other  direct  taxes negligible negligible 1 negligible negligible negligible
 Indirect  taxation 
  (on domestic goods and services)
    VAT revenues or General Sales Tax   ≈ 6 > 13 3 >8   ≈ 101) > 81)
  International trade-related taxes 
  (incl. customs duties)
2 n.a. 6 3 ≈ 42
  Other tax revenue < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 ≈ 3
Non-tax revenues (excl. privatisation)   ≈ 10   ≈ 57   ≈ 10 2 < 3
External grants 1  ≈ 2 negligible < 8 n.a. negligible
Expenditure
(as % of GDP)
Current expenditure   ≈ 30 39 332)  ≈ 30   ≈ 24 20
  Wages and salaries 8 ≈ 91 1 ≈ 6 > 12 11
  Purchases of goods and services < 3 n.a. n.a. < 3 negligible < 2
 Defence <  3 10 3 ≈ 10  ≈ 4<  2
  Interest payments on debt  ≈ 6 6 15 4 > 4 < 3
  Subsidies and other transfers  ≈ 8 14 n.a. ≈ 833
Capital expenditure   ≈ 5>  2 3 7≈ 6 ≈ 6
Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Data are averages for 2000-2004 or 2000-2005 (if 2005 included: preliminary estimate). Data for Egypt and Jordan refer to 
general government, for Israel, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia to central government. No data for West Bank and Gaza (see Box 2).
1)  For Morocco and Tunisia the item VAT or General Sales Tax includes revenues from excise duties.
2) For Lebanon, data for subsidies and other transfers and purchases of goods and services are not available; they appear to be 
summarised in IMF data in the category “other current expenditure”, which makes up around 4% of GDP.      
some key features and issues. A broad overview 
of budgetary structures in both non-oil-
producing countries and oil-producing countries 
as regards the key revenue and expenditure 
items as a share of GDP is provided in Tables 6 
and 7.
3.1 REVENUE  STRUCTURE
The revenue structure of oil-producing versus 
non-oil-producing countries differs significantly 
due to the importance of oil-related revenue in 
the budget of oil-producing countries. Starting 
the analysis with non-oil-producing countries, 
these are characterised in general by higher tax 
revenues than oil producers. Tax revenue as a 
share of total revenue is the highest in Morocco 
and Tunisia (90% for both) and the lowest in 
Jordan (less than 50%) due notably to Jordan’s 
heavy dependence on foreign grants (see 
Table 8). The contribution of direct taxation (on 15
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Table 7 Budgetary structure of oil-producing Mediterranean countries
Revenue Algeria Libya Syria
(as % of GDP)
Hydrocarbon (oil and gas) 25 51 14
Non-hydrocarbon 11 11 > 14
 Tax  revenues 10 9 10
    Direct taxation (on income and profits) 2 2 4
    Indirect taxation (on goods and services)      5 n.a. n.a.
    International trade-related taxes (incl. customs duties) 3 4 2
  Non-tax revenues (excl. privatisation) 1 2 4
External grants negligible negligible negligible
Expenditure
(as % of GDP)
Current expenditure ≈ 22 301) ≈ 19
  Wages and salaries < 8 > 10 > 5
  Purchases of goods and services < 3 < 3 < 2
 Defence 325
  Interest payments on debt < 3 negligible < 1
  Subsidies and other transfers > 6 2 5
Capital expenditure 10 > 14 12
Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Data are averages for 2000-2004 or 2000-2005 (if 2005 included: preliminary estimate). Data for Libya and Syria refer to general 
government, for Algeria to central government.
1)  There is considerable uncertainty as regards the classification of current expenditure for Libya. Current expenditure is around 30% 
of GDP according to IMF data. The sum of the sub-items of current expenditure, however, is only around 17%, i.e. current expenditure 
of around 13% of GDP, classified as “administrative expenditure”, cannot be assigned to more detailed spending categories. Therefore, 
spending on wages and salaries, defence, and subsidies and transfers can be expected to be higher than shown in this table.   
Table 8 Revenue structure of non-oil-producing countries
(% of total revenue)
Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia
T a x 5 78 14 86 59 08 9
Direct 24 42 8 19 33 32
Indirect 24 36 28 26 40 40
Trade 6 n.a. 9 17 12 6
Other negligible 2335 1 1
Non-tax 41 13 22 34 10 11
Grants 2 6 30 1 negligible negligible
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IMF (2005 data, for Jordan 2004).
income and profit) to total revenue appears 
highly heterogeneous. It is highest in Israel 
(42%), which appears as an outlier in the region, 
and lowest in Jordan (8%). In general, the 
contribution of direct taxes to budgetary income 
is relatively low, reflecting inter alia problems 
with tax compliance and weaknesses in tax 
administration, as levying direct taxes tends to 
require more administrative capacity than 
raising indirect taxes.14
14 See Crandall and Bodin (2005) on reforms of revenue 
administration in Middle Eastern countries.
Indirect taxes are a more important source of 
revenue than direct taxes (except for Israel), 
and the contribution of indirect taxation (VAT 
and excise duties) to total revenues is higher 
than in oil-producing countries. In particular 
VAT, which has been introduced in all 
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Algeria 2) 17 3.1 0.18
Egypt 10 2.5 0.25
Israel 2) 17 8.5 0.50
Jordan 16 8.5 0.53
Lebanon 10 3.8 0.38
Morocco 20 6.1 0.31
Tunisia 18 6.3 0.35
Selected euro area countries
France 19.6 7.0 0.36
Germany 16 6.3 0.39
Italy 20 7.5 0.38
Selected OECD countries
Australia 10 4.1 0.41
Canada 7 3.5 0.50
New Zealand 12.5 9.2 0.74
Sources: IMF, national sources and ECB staff calculations.
1) Libya and Syria do not have a VAT. West Bank and Gaza has a VAT but due to the specific features of collection it is not listed here 
(see Box 2).
2) Data refer to 2004. 
over the past two decades, has become a 
relatively efficient revenue-raising instrument 
and a stable source of budgetary income. 
Nevertheless, the revenue-generating potential 
of VAT differs among countries, depending on 
specific VAT features. Revenue productivity, 
which can be measured by relating the standard 
VAT rate to revenue, tends to be higher in those 
countries in which VAT is relatively broad 
based with as few exemptions and reduced rates 
as possible (see Table 9). 
The relative weight of taxes on foreign trade in 
total revenue also appears heterogeneous. It is 
highest at 17% in Lebanon, which seems to point 
to the country’s limited progress regarding trade 
liberalisation. Foreign trade taxes continue to 
provide a non-negligible share of revenue to the 
budget also in the other Mediterranean countries, 
in particular Morocco and Jordan. The share of 
this formerly important source of revenue is 
however declining in most countries in line with 
trade liberalisation, for example in the context of 
Association Agreements with the EU.          
The share of non-tax revenues appears 
significant in several countries, in particular in 
Egypt and Lebanon. In Lebanon non-tax 
revenue stems mainly from entrepreneurial and 
property income, while in Egypt its main 
components are transfers from the petroleum 
authority, the Suez Canal Authority and the 
central bank.  
The budget of several countries, in particular in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, continues to be 
dependent on foreign grants or other forms of 
donor assistance and concessional financing. In 
Jordan, grants have in recent years accounted 
for around 10% of GDP and 30% of total 
revenues. Although they decreased sharply in 
2005 (after the end of the scheme for subsidised 
oil from Saudi Arabia), they still account for 
nearly 5% of GDP and 15% of total revenues. 
Israel is the other country for which grants are 
significant and which in addition benefits from 
US loan guarantees for part of its debt. While 
grants are low in Lebanon, the country benefits 
from the arrangements in the Paris II agreement, 
mainly from a significant reduction of interest 
expenditure.15
15  In January 2007 further international assistance (“Paris III”) 
was pledged to Lebanon in order to alleviate the aggravated 
economic and fiscal situation in the aftermath of the military 
conflict of summer 2006. The new assistance package includes 
a substantial share of direct budget support.17
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Table 10 Revenue structure of oil-producing 
countries
(% of total revenue)
Algeria Libya Syria
Hydrocarbon 71 93 33
Non-hydrocarbon 29 7 67
 Tax 26 4 40
  Direct 7 1 14
  Indirect 12 n.a. n.a.
  Trade 7 1 7
  Other - 2 19
 Non-tax 3 2 27
Total 100 100 100
Source: IMF (2005 data). 
Privatisation has provided important revenues 
in most countries of the region, although 
proceeds differ from country to country, appear 
relatively volatile, and do not constitute a 
permanent source of income for funding current 
expenditure. Proceeds from privatisation have 
been high in Israel and Jordan, and in some 
cases have been boosted by the privatisation of 
the telecommunication sector. This was the case 
for example for Morocco in 2001 and Tunisia in 
2006. Privatisation revenue is expected to 
provide an important source of income in those 
countries where the involvement of the state in 
the productive sectors of the economy remains 
significant and where the reform process is now 
accelerating (notably Algeria and Egypt).     
In the oil-producing countries, hydrocarbon 
revenues constitute by far the largest source of 
budgetary income (see Table 10). In addition, the 
positive terms-of-trade shock experienced in the 
past several years has further increased the weight 
of hydrocarbon revenue in the budgets of these 
countries. In the case of Algeria and Libya, 
dependence on oil and gas is particularly high, as 
the revenues derived from these sources account 
for about 70% of total revenue in Algeria and 
more than 90% in Libya. As for Syria, reliance on 
oil revenues still remains at a significant level, at 
one-third of total revenue, although it is expected 
to decline in the coming years due to the depletion 
of oil reserves. The need to compensate for 
shrinking oil revenue with an alternative source 
of income will thus be an important challenge 
for the Syrian authorities (see also Sub-
section 4.1.2).
The share of non-hydrocarbon – and in particular 
tax – revenues in the budgets of Mediterranean 
oil-producing countries is comparatively low. 
Only in the Syrian budget do non-hydrocarbon 
revenues represent more than half of budgetary 
income, with a significant share of non-tax 
revenues (transfers of profits from state-owned 
enterprises).   
The low revenue-to-GDP ratio outside the 
hydrocarbon sector reflects the difficulty of 
raising taxes with existing underdeveloped 
tax and customs systems and the (perceived) 
lack of a need for higher tax revenues in view 
of hydrocarbon wealth. Except for Algeria, the 
oil-producing countries in the region do not 
levy VAT. Even in Algeria, the revenue generated 
from this otherwise important source of 
budgetary income in the region is relatively 
low. In addition, taxes on foreign trade account 
for a sizeable share of tax revenue, which – like 
in non-oil-producing countries – can be 
expected to decline, for example in Libya 
(due to the import tariff reform of August 2005) 
and in Algeria (which is negotiating WTO 
entry). 
Box 1
FISCAL POLICY CHALLENGES IN OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES
Fiscal policy in oil-producing countries faces specific challenges related to the fact that oil 
revenues are exhaustible, volatile, unpredictable and largely originate from abroad. These 
features of oil revenues pose challenges in both the long and the short term.1 Their relevance 
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depends on the share of hydrocarbon (oil and gas) revenues in the government’s overall 
revenues and in total exports and the weight of the hydrocarbon sector in the economy. In the 
Mediterranean region, these shares are relatively high in Algeria, Libya and Syria (see table 
above).
Long-term challenges
In the long term, the challenge derives from the exhaustibility of oil reserves and concerns the 
issues of budgetary sustainability and intergenerational resource allocation. To avoid a sharp 
adjustment of fiscal policy once oil reserves are exhausted and to secure the participation of 
future generations in this source of national wealth, oil-producing countries have to accumulate 
financial assets during the period in which they produce oil, in particular when prices are high. 
After the end of oil production, the revenues from these assets can be used to replace oil income 
and to maintain levels of expenditure. Oil wealth is thus gradually transformed into financial 
wealth, leaving the country’s overall wealth unchanged and preserving it for future generations. 
Intuitively, this reasoning is straightforward and makes a strong case for persistent overall 
fiscal surpluses to accumulate assets. However, deriving concrete policy conclusions and 
making them operational is challenging. For example, estimating the oil wealth of a country, 
defined as the discounted present value of future oil revenues, is surrounded by significant 
uncertainty regarding the underlying assumptions, e.g. about the future path of oil prices, about 
oil reserves, and about the costs of extracting them, which supports a generally cautious 
approach to fiscal policy. Uncertainty also prevails regarding the role of government capital 
expenditure in preserving overall wealth. In principle, capital expenditure and the accumulation 
of real assets could represent an alternative to the accumulation of financial assets, thereby 
reducing the need for persistent fiscal surpluses. However, the uncertainties surrounding the 
effects of public capital expenditure on productivity, future output and government revenues, 
and the difficulties in distinguishing between capital expenditure and current expenditure, 
warrant caution in this regard. Indeed, due to governance and institutional deficiencies, which 
can be observed in some oil-producing countries, the ex-post real return of public investment 
may be lower than the return on financial assets offered by mature economies.
Short-term challenges
The main short-term challenge for fiscal policy in oil-producing countries stems from the 
unpredictability of oil prices. Public finances are highly dependent on a volatile variable that 
is largely beyond the authorities’ control. This poses a problem with regard to both 
macroeconomic management and fiscal planning. The volatility of oil prices, and hence 
government revenues, tends to contribute to a pro-cyclical pattern and abrupt changes in 
government spending, as experienced in many countries during the 1970s and 1980s, which 
may translate into macroeconomic volatility and reduced growth prospects. Thus, there is a 
case for smoothing public expenditure in oil-producing countries, which is further reinforced 
Hydrocarbon dependency of Mediterranean countries (2005)
 
Hydrocarbon share (%) Algeria Libya Syria
 Government  revenue 71 93 33
 Overall  exports 98 97 66
 GDP 45 73 28
Sources: IMF, Economist Intelligence Unit. 19
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by the other potential fiscal costs of volatile expenditure policies. These may include a reduction 
in the quality and efficiency of spending due to constraints in the administrative capacity or 
the realisation of projects with little marginal value added during periods of high oil prices, 
and difficulties in containing and streamlining expenditure following an expansion. The 
planning of a fiscal stance by targeting a particular level of the overall budget balance is 
rendered difficult by oil price volatility. Therefore, other indicators are needed to guide 
fiscal policy and to assess the underlying fiscal stance, such as the non-oil balance/non-oil GDP 
ratio, an indicator which isolates the budget balance from oil price developments. This is 
all the more needed if the depletion of oil reserves is no longer a distant prospect (see also 
Sub-section 4.3). 
Stabilisation and savings funds2
Several countries deriving substantial export and fiscal revenue from oil (or other non-renewable 
resources) have set up stabilisation and savings funds to deal with both the long-term and short-
term challenges for fiscal policy. The savings function of such funds is meant to address the 
long-term issue of intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability by accumulating assets, 
while the stabilisation function addresses the short-term issues of fiscal planning and 
macroeconomic stability by absorbing and injecting revenue from/into the budget. However, 
such funds pose a number of problems in themselves, for example as regards governance, 
transparency and accountability. They are not a substitute for explicit fiscal policy decisions 
or (numerical or procedural) fiscal rules and political commitment both to smoothing expenditure 
and to ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, their contribution to sound fiscal 
policies depends on the general quality of institutions and public financial management.
Oil-producing countries could in principle also deal with the unpredictability of oil prices and 
revenues by using market instruments to hedge oil market risks. However, financial derivatives 
are sparsely used by oil-producing countries. This may be due to, among other things, so far 
underdeveloped markets for such products and to political economy and institutional 
constraints.3
In the Mediterranean region, both Algeria and Libya have established oil funds. In 2000, 
Algeria established an off-budget hydrocarbon stabilisation fund (Fonds de régulation des 
recettes) in order to: (i) reconstitute the cushion of external reserves that had previously 
declined; (ii) service the stock of public debt; and (iii) smooth the longer-term profile of 
expenditures. The fund does not have an intergenerational transfer purpose. Hydrocarbon 
revenues in excess of those budgeted (usually on very conservative oil price assumptions) are 
deposited in the fund. The operational features of the fund leave significant room for discretion. 
Libya has an oil reserve fund (ORF) since 1995, which is a government account managed by 
the central bank. It accumulates oil revenue in excess of the level determined by a budgetary 
oil price. Withdrawals from the ORF, mostly for current expenditure, take place on a discretionary 
basis. The ORF is not integrated into the budget, and its operations are considered as not being 
transparent.
2  See Davis, Ossowski, Daniel and Barnett (2001). Stabilisation and savings funds are also referred to as sovereign wealth funds.
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3.2 EXPENDITURE  STRUCTURE
While differences between oil-producing and 
non-oil-producing countries are also observable 
on the expenditure side of the budget, they are 
less pronounced than on the revenue side. The 
major differences refer to the relative weight of 
capital expenditure (higher in oil-producing 
countries) and interest expenditure (higher in 
non-oil-producing countries). 
In  non-oil-producing countries, the relative 
weight of current expenditure is much higher, 
accounting for at least three-quarters of total 
expenditure in all countries and more than 
90% in Lebanon and Israel (see Table 11). In 
the latter two cases, the comparatively high 
weight of current expenditure is largely 
explained either by high interest payments on 
debt (Lebanon) or the importance of defence 
expenditure (Israel). Capital spending is thus 
comparatively low in both countries, standing 
at less than 10% of total expenditure.  
Current expenditure can be split into key items: 
wages and salaries, transfers and subsidies, 
interest payments and also defence expenditure 
as it appears significant for several Eastern 
Mediterranean countries. 
Tunisia and Morocco are characterised by the 
very high share of the wage bill, which absorbs 
more than 40% of total expenditure, although 
in Morocco the recent voluntary retirement 
programme is expected to better contain the 
Table 11 Expenditure structure of non-oil-producing countries
(% of total expenditure)
Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia
Current 86 91 75 93 78 76
Wages & salaries 24 20 14 23 42 45
Transfers & subsidies 24 32 27 29 6 14
Interest payments 18 16 7 34 13 11
Defence expenditure n.a. 21 21 n.a. 15 n.a.
Other expenditure 20 2 6 6 2 6
Capital 14 9 25 7 22 24
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IMF (2005 data, for Jordan 2004).  
wage bill in the medium term. By contrast, the 
share of the wage bill is very low in Jordan. 
Although the share of transfers and subsidies is 
surprisingly low in Morocco (given the prevalence 
of poverty), it is generally much higher than in 
oil-producing countries (excluding Algeria). In 
Israel transfers and subsidies stand at one-third 
of total expenditure, but in contrast with other 
countries in the region most expenditures covered 
under this item are transfers (not subsidies), 
reflecting the features of the social system which 
are similar to European countries. In the other 
Mediterranean countries, explicit and implicit 
subsidies are prevalent as a key instrument of 
social policies, in particular for petroleum 
products and food items.
The weight of interest payments appears 
heterogeneous but it is far higher than in oil-
producing countries. In all countries except 
Jordan, interest payments account for more than 
10% of total expenditure. In Lebanon interest 
payments constitute one-third of total expenditure 
and absorb nearly half of total revenue. 
A key feature on the expenditure side in 
particular in Eastern Mediterranean countries is 
high defence outlays, which for instance 
account for more than 20% of total expenditure 
in both Israel and Jordan. 
In the oil-producing countries, the relative 
weight of capital expenditure is comparatively 
high (see Table 12). This is most strikingly the 21
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Box 2
WEST BANK AND GAZA BUDGET STRUCTURE1
The budgetary structure of the West Bank and Gaza exhibits some very special features which 
make it different from other countries in the region. These concern most specifically the way 
trade-related taxes are collected (by another country), the weight of the wage bill in total 
expenditure and the reliance on external budget support from foreign donors, the latter two of 
which are even higher than in other countries of the region. 
Revenue and expenditure
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has three main sources of revenue (see table below): first, the 
so-called “clearance revenues” (the Israeli authorities collect and remit to the PA taxes levied 
in Israel on merchandise destined for the West Bank and Gaza), which represent about one-third 
of total revenue; second, the revenue from other taxes raised domestically; and third, foreign 
donor assistance, which is very high (representing more than half of total revenue, although it 
Table 12 Expenditure structure of oil-
producing countries
(% of total expenditure) 
Algeria Libya1) Syria
Current 66 46 62
Wages & salaries 24 24 20
Transfers & subsidies 34 6 18
Interest payments 5 - 4
Defence expenditure n.a. 5 16
Capital 34 54 38
Total 100 100 100
Source: IMF (2005 data).
1) See footnote 2 in Table 7 on the uncertainty as regards the 
classification of current expenditure in Libya.
case for Libya where capital expenditure 
appears to even exceed current expenditure 
(although the current expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
is very high at around 30%). The high level of 
capital expenditure is largely due to the 
implementation of a number of extraordinary 
projects, notably the gas pipeline connecting 
Italy to Libya (half of which was financed by 
Libya). As for Algeria and Syria, the relative 
share of capital expenditure is lower, accounting 
for about one-third of total expenditure. The 
high hydrocarbon prices of recent years have 
not led to spending booms so far. However, 
capital expenditure is expected to further 
increase in the coming years, in particular in 
Algeria, as the government plans to develop 
physical infrastructure and to address the 
population’s housing needs. It is also expected 
to remain at a high level in Libya as basic 
infrastructure deteriorated significantly under 
the international sanctions imposed on the 
country until recently. 
Concerning current expenditure items, the share 
of wages and salaries is at similar levels in all 
countries. However, it is expected to rise in 
Algeria and Libya following recent significant 
increases in public sector wages. As for 
subsidies and transfers, they are notoriously 
high in Algeria, accounting for more than one-
third of total expenditure. In all countries 
interest payments on public debt stand at a low 
level. They are expected to decrease in Algeria 
following recent early debt repayments to 
foreign creditors. As for Libya, the budget no 
longer includes any interest payment since 
public debt has been entirely repaid. Finally, 
defence expenditure accounts for a significant 
share of total spending in Syria.
1  The information contained in this box is drawn from various World Bank and IMF documents and covers only the period until end-
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is technically treated as a financing item in the official PA budget). On the expenditure side, 
the budget structure of the PA is characterised by the predominant weight of the wage bill, 
absorbing nearly all domestically raised revenue. 
External financing 
The PA has been able to maintain delivery of core services thanks to extensive foreign assistance 
in the form of direct budget support. The main budget support instrument is the multi-donor 
trust fund administered by the World Bank (12 donors had contributed to this trust fund by 
end-2005). The PA and the World Bank agree every six months on a set of specific reform 
benchmarks that, upon fulfilment, trigger disbursements. Other donors, mostly from the Gulf 
countries, provide budgetary assistance on a bilateral basis.  
Budget deficit 
The budget deficit reached USD 777 million in 2005 (17% of estimated GDP), up from USD 
576 million in 2004 (14% of estimated GDP). This was due to higher spending (+30%) stemming 
from large increases in public sector wages (breaching in the second half of 2005 the Wage Bill 
Containment Plan agreed with the World Bank) and net lending (to the Gaza Electricity 
Distribution Company and municipalities in the West Bank for the payment of utilities). Only 
USD 349 million were received in budget support, roughly half the USD 654 million that had 
been foreseen in the budget. The resulting gap was financed mainly by borrowing from domestic 
banks. Although the PA budget does not foresee any borrowing from domestic banks (as shown 
in the table above), the effective budget gap has consistently led to the necessity to increase 
indebtedness vis-à-vis the domestic banking sector (funded with a relatively stable deposit 
base).  
Budget management, transparency and accountability
Considerable progress has been made in budget management, transparency and accountability 
in the period 2002-05. All PA revenues are now paid into a single Treasury account (eliminating 
previous non-transparent and discretionary spending from various off-budget accounts); an 
orderly system of budget appropriation is now in place; the budget and monthly budget 
execution reports are posted on the website of the Ministry of Finance (MOF); the annual 
budget is approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC); internal and external audit 
functions have been strengthened; public sector salaries are deposited in individual bank 
accounts and no longer paid in cash; the establishment of a Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF) 
has brought all PA equity holdings under MOF oversight; and the management of the PA’s 
petroleum monopoly has been taken over directly by the MOF.  
Sources of revenues in the PA budget
(% of total revenue)
2003 Budget 2004 Budget 2005 Budget
Clearance revenue 25 30 30
Other domestic taxes 16 17 18
External financing 58 53 53
Source: Ministry of Finance.23
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Overall assessment
The PA budget is following a path that is clearly unsustainable in the medium term as the wage 
bill is increasing rapidly and donor support falls far short of commitments (even before the 
2006 events). Thus, the deficit is financed by additional borrowing from domestic banks, 
liquidation of PIF assets, and accumulation of arrears including towards the pension fund and 
private suppliers. Given the share of the wage bill in the PA budget, restoring fiscal sustainability 
implies first of all strict containment of hiring and salary adjustments (in particular in the 
security forces). It also necessitates a reduction in net lending through higher compliance in 
the payment of utility bills at the municipal level. Finally, it hinges on both the regular transfer 
by Israel of clearance revenue to the PA and high foreign assistance by the donor community.      
3.3  CHALLENGES CONCERNING THE STRUCTURE 
OF BUDGETS 
The review of the revenue and expenditure 
structure reveals some key features and 
challenges in Mediterranean countries’ budget 
structure. 
On the revenue side, a key feature appears to be 
the low weight of tax revenue, as witnessed 
by a relatively low ratio of tax to GDP. For 
example, direct tax revenues account for only 
7% of GDP in Morocco and Tunisia, for around 
or less than 5% in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Syria, and for 2% in Algeria and Libya. This 
compares with 11-14% in euro area countries 
like Germany, France and Italy, and with around 
8% in Turkey, which may be a more appropriate 
benchmark. While indirect taxes provide more 
revenue than direct taxes in most Mediterranean 
countries, with a share of around or below 10% 
of GDP, indirect tax revenues lag for example 
those of Turkey (around 15% of GDP). In 
addition, the part of the indirect tax revenue in 
the form of international trade-related taxes has 
already declined – and will likely further drop 
– in the wake of ongoing trade liberalisation.
Thus, one challenge for the authorities of most 
Mediterranean countries is to guarantee the 
sustainability of public finances by generating 
sufficient tax revenue to cover essential public 
expenses, while trying to minimise at the same 
time the disincentives to work, save and invest. 
To achieve this goal, increases of tax rates are 
usually counterproductive as they tend to 
increase distortions in the economy and 
incentives for tax evasion. A broadening of the 
tax base by limiting or even eliminating 
exemptions seems to be a more promising way 
to increase revenue, while keeping rates at 
relatively lower levels. Increasing tax revenue 
also requires combating tax evasion through a 
further strengthening of tax administrations. 
Some Mediterranean countries have started to 
follow this route, for instance Egypt, where 
income tax rates have recently been cut in half 
while revenue administration has improved.       
The degree of donor dependence is also high 
and appears as a key revenue component in the 
budget of several Eastern Mediterranean 
countries. Dependence on external aid makes a 
country vulnerable to the extent that foreign 
grants may be volatile and thus not easily 
predictable. Furthermore, they lessen the 
incentives to develop domestic sources of 
revenue or to cut unproductive expenditure. In 
the past, foreign grants to Mediterranean 
countries have been relatively stable, but in the 
most recent period they have decreased in some 
countries like Jordan, thereby raising fiscal 
pressure. 
On the expenditure side, the budgetary cost of 
subsidies (mostly on energy and food items) is 
high in most Mediterranean countries. In 
addition to the enormous fiscal drain, subsidies 
are questionable both from a distributional and 
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perspective, subsidies in most Mediterranean 
countries appear largely ill-targeted or even 
universal (i.e. not targeted at all), and have a 
regressive effect, as – while also benefiting the 
most vulnerable segments of the population – 
recipients of higher incomes usually consume 
more of the subsidised products in absolute 
terms.16 Thus, most of the subsidy goes to 
higher-income groups. From an allocation 
perspective, subsidies cause price distortions. 
Oil subsidies are particularly questionable 
given that artificially low prices result in energy 
inefficiency and excessive consumption, thus 
also contributing to environmental damage. 
Phasing out these subsidies, however, is 
challenging from a political point of view and 
thus the authorities of many Mediterranean 
countries appear reluctant to address this issue, 
notwithstanding recent progress in this regard 
(for instance in Egypt – a country in which fuel 
subsidies account for 7% of GDP – energy 
subsidies were reduced in July 2006, and also 
Jordan has significantly cut subsidies since 
2005). Political resistance might be alleviated 
by compensating the most vulnerable segments 
of the population with better-targeted direct 
transfers, which provide a more cost-effective 
approach to social protection and thereby might 
also contribute to budgetary savings. 
The budget of some countries, in particular of 
non-oil producers in the region, appears to 
display a relatively low degree of flexibility, 
which leaves little margin for manoeuvre for 
the authorities, for instance to address balance 
of payments pressures or new spending 
priorities. Flexibility is increased when the 
share of “pre-committed” spending outlays in 
overall expenditure is as low as possible. 
Typically, certain categories of spending appear 
more rigid than others, in particular in the short 
run. Indeed, it is usually more difficult to reduce 
the share of wages and salaries (as shown in the 
case of Tunisia and Morocco) and of interest 
payments (as shown in the case of Lebanon) 
than to freeze some capital outlays.17 Thus, 
limiting rigidity in the budget is also a challenge 
for the authorities of many Mediterranean 
countries. 
Overall, while countries in the region face 
challenges both on the revenue and the 
expenditure side of their budgets, the key issue 
appears to be comprehensive expenditure 
reform. This is evidenced both by the high share 
of public expenditure in GDP relative to 
countries at similar levels of income per capita 
(Section 2), and by relatively high spending 
on wages and salaries and in particular on 
subsidies.18
16  See e.g. World Bank (2006) for the distributional effects of oil 
subsidies in Egypt.
17 Wages and salaries account for more than 10% of GDP in 
Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon and Libya, and thereby exhibit 
levels similar to euro area countries like Germany, France and 
Italy, despite a lower income per capita. 
18 Analysis of public expenditure reforms in industrialised 
countries over the past two decades suggests that ambitious 
expenditure retrenchment and reform, accompanied by 
improvements in fiscal institutions, coincided with large 
improvements in fiscal and growth indicators for those countries 
that underwent such reforms. See Hauptmeier, Heipertz and 
Schuknecht (2006).25
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4  KEY FISCAL POLICY CHALLENGES IN 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY
The main channels, through which fiscal policy 
can affect monetary policy and price stability 
(as well as macroeconomic and financial 
stability), are interest rates and sovereign 
spreads, the exchange rate, aggregate demand, 
and expectations.19 Against this background, it 
is worthwhile elaborating upon the extent to 
which the issues identified and examined in 
Sections 2 and 3 have implications for the 
monetary and exchange rate policies of 
Mediterranean countries’ central banks. 
Therefore, this section focuses on the role of 
fiscal policy in achieving and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability and on specific 
features on the revenue and expenditure side 
and their potential implications for monetary 
policy. Furthermore, it also discusses fiscal 
rules and the potential contribution they can 
make to improve fiscal policy outcomes and 
thereby the environment in which monetary 
policy is conducted.
4.1  FISCAL POLICY AND MACROECONOMIC 
STABILITY
4.1.1 NON-OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES: 
VULNERABILITIES RESULTING FROM HIGH 
DEFICITS AND DEBT 
Mediterranean countries have achieved a 
relatively high degree of macroeconomic 
stability in recent years, best evidenced by 
generally low inflation. While this is part of a 
global trend observable in many emerging 
market economies over the 1990s, it also 
reflects deliberate policy efforts in the region, 
for example the strengthening of monetary 
frameworks and structural reforms, in many 
cases underpinned by IMF programs.20 Fiscal 
consolidation has been an important element of 
macroeconomic stabilisation, as high fiscal 
deficits were at the root of instability in many 
Mediterranean countries during the 1980s. 
Examples are Israel before the stabilisation 
programme of 1985, Egypt before 1992 and 
Jordan before the currency crisis of 1989. 
Compared with the 1980s and early 1990s 
budget deficits have come down in most 
countries and in the region as a whole 
(Section 2). 
Notwithstanding these successes in bringing 
down inflation and reducing budget deficits and 
public debt, many non-oil-producing countries 
still exhibit relatively high deficits, and remain 
highly indebted. In some cases, the debt 
structure also appears fragile (see Box 3). Most 
studies indicate that the sustainable level of 
public debt for emerging market economies – 
while varying among countries – is relatively 
low, and according to all recent studies below 
50% of GDP.21 With the exception of Algeria 
and Libya, public debt of all Mediterranean 
countries was above this threshold in 2005. In 
addition to recorded public debt, some countries 
appear to face contingent liabilities, for instance 
in the form of non-performing loans of state 
banks. Furthermore, implicit liabilities of pay-
as-you-go pension systems could pose additional 
challenges for some countries in the region.22 
As a result, these countries face continued 
vulnerabilities and a limited capability to 
absorb shocks without jeopardising 
macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. 
Little scope exists for policy slippage or for 
accommodating external shocks resulting in 
expenditure increases or revenue losses. 
19  For an overview of the channels through which fiscal policy can 
affect monetary policy in emerging market economies and the 
existing literature on the topic, see Zoli (2005).
20  Abed (2006) characterises the reforms between the mid-1980s 
and the mid-1990s as “reforms by necessity”, as opposed to the 
“reforms by choice” which were implemented after 2000 in 
many Mediterranean countries.
21  See IMF (2003) and the overview of studies on public debt in 
emerging markets given there.
22 See Robalino (2005). While – unlike in most industrialised 
countries – demographic trends are still favourable with regard 
to the financing of pension systems, many systems in the region 
appear financially unsustainable, reflecting high implicit rates 
of return on contributions. These result from a misalignment of 
retirement ages, benefits and contribution rates, implying large 
and unaffordable pension promises. Implicit liabilities are 
estimated as high as 175% of GDP in Jordan, 130% in Morocco, 
and in the range of 50-100% in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia 
and the West Bank and Gaza. Thus, even with favourable 
demographics pension systems might eventually run into trouble 
in the absence of reforms. A number of countries, such as Egypt, 
Jordan and Morocco, are in the process of implementing 
important pension reforms.    
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Accordingly, a continuous debt reduction is 
warranted, requiring constant fiscal discipline 
and sustained economic growth.
Vulnerability is highest in those countries 
combining a high debt level, a high share of 
external debt (or foreign currency-denominated 
debt), an open capital account and an exchange 
rate peg. This is in particular the case for 
Lebanon and Jordan, which share all four 
features, and in addition exhibit large current 
account deficits. Concerns about debt 
sustainability are most pressing for Lebanon, 
given the level, the trend and the structure of 
public debt.23 Moreover, the strong linkage 
between the public sector and the financial 
system via the banks’ holding of government 
securities, together with a high share of foreign 
currency-denominated debt (almost 50% of 
total public debt, equivalent to around 80% of 
GDP), represent a large vulnerability. In case of 
a sharp exchange rate depreciation and/or 
difficulties in servicing public debt, financial 
stability and the banking system might be 
threatened. 
23  This was the case even before the military operations of summer 
2006, which exacerbated the fiscal situation and led to further 
international donor support (see also footnote 15, Section 3).
Box 3
THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC DEBT IN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
The structure of public debt in Mediterranean countries is an indication of the degree of 
macroeconomic vulnerability which, in case of an adverse macroeconomic shock, could 
negatively affect economic growth and financial stability. The analysis takes into account 
several features of public debt including domestic versus external composition, foreign currency 
composition of external debt, maturity, fixed versus floating interest rates and loans versus 
securities (see table below).
The most relevant aspects can be summed up as follows:
(a)  External versus domestic debt.1 The highest dependency on external debt is found in Jordan, 
where almost three-quarters of total public debt is external, and also in Algeria, Syria and 
Tunisia more than half of total public debt is external. A common feature in most countries 
is the predominance of (long-term) loans in external debt as a result of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements (with the exception of Israel and Lebanon, which regularly issue 
foreign currency-denominated securities on the international market, and partially also 
Tunisia). In order to support their efforts to tap international financial markets, a number 
of Mediterranean countries have received a rating by a rating agency, mostly in the 1990s. 
Looking at Standard & Poor’s data, only two countries – Israel and Tunisia – experienced 
an upgrade in the course of their rating history, while the four others were downgraded at 
some point in time (see Charts A and B).
  Domestic debt plays a major role in Lebanon (80% of total public debt), in Egypt and Israel 
(about three-quarters of total public debt), as well as in Morocco. The lion’s share of 
Lebanese domestic debt (mainly made up of tradable bills and Eurobonds) is held by the 
financial system (commercial banks) and the central bank. A specific feature of Lebanon’s 
domestic debt is that a significant share is denominated in foreign currency. As a result, 
1  Domestic or internal debt is defined as the share of total public debt owed to lenders within the country, while external debt refers 
to the share owed to foreign lenders.27
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nearly half of the country’s total public debt (or public debt equivalent to around 80% of 
GDP) is foreign currency denominated. This means that exposure to potential exchange 
rate variations is much higher than implied by the share of external debt in total debt. In 
Egypt and Israel, a large share of domestic debt consists of non-tradable securities (around 
one-third) held by the central bank, state-owned enterprises and households (Egypt), and 
pension funds and insurance companies (Israel). In Egypt, less than 25% of domestic debt 
is fully tradable and more than 40% is partially tradable (only among financial institutions), 
while Israeli tradable domestic debt is characterised by the distinction between non-
indexed, CPI-indexed and US dollar-indexed securities. In general the share of domestic 
debt in total public debt has increased over the past years, reflecting also the development 
of domestic debt markets, e.g. in Morocco. 
(b)  Currency composition of external debt. The US dollar remains the predominant foreign 
currency in most Mediterranean countries’ external debt. However, the share of the euro 
has been increasing in recent years. Diminishing the exposure to US dollar-euro exchange 
rate movements is possibly one motive for diversifying the currency composition of 
The structure of public debt in Mediterranean countries (2005)
External vs domestic debt Currency 
composition of 
external debt







as percent of 
GDP
as percent of 
total public 
debt
as percent of total 
public debt
as percent of total 
public debt
Algeria  20.3/16.3 55.4/44.6 45% USD, 
40% EUR, 
10% JPY
External: 2% ST, 98%  
M/LT; Domestic: < 20% 
ST, > 80% M/LT
- 62.5/37.5
Egypt4)  35.2/76.7 29.9/70.1 Predominantly USD, 
and EUR
Domestic: 75.8% M/LT, 
24.2% ST; External:   





Israel  25.4/76.4 25/75 90% USD, 
5 % EUR, 1% GBP, 
4% other
≈ 12% < 5 years, 




Jordan  61.1/22.8 72.8/28.2 Predominantly USD, 
and EUR
External: no short-term 




35/140 20/80 84% USD, 
12% EUR, 3% KWD 
(Kuwaiti dinar), 
1% other
All domestic debt < 5 













 All external debt M/LT
External: 
68% fixed rate, 
8% semi fixed 
rate and 24% 
floating rate
32.2/67.8
Syria 25.0/13.23) 65.4/35.6 - - - 100/0
Tunisia  37.7/21.3 63.9/36.1 53.5% EUR, 21.5% 
USD, 17.8 % JPY, 
4.6% KWD, 2.6% 
other (2004 data)
Total: 12% ST, 
88% M/LT
- 51.7/48.3
Sources: IMF, EIB and national Ministries of Finance.
Note: No data on Libya, as the country has almost completely repaid public debt in 2003 and 2004, and on West Bank and Gaza.
1) Maturity < 1 year: short-term (ST); maturity 1-5 years: medium-term (MT); maturity > 5 years: medium- to long-term 
(M/LT).
2)  Data on loans vs securities refer to central government only and to December 2004 (Egypt: June 2004, Jordan: March 2005). 
3) Net  debt.
4) 2004 data.
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external debt in the region. Morocco and Tunisia are two exceptions, as the bulk of external 
debt (more than 50%) is in euro, while the US dollar and Japanese yen account for 20% 
and 15% respectively. This reflects their direction of trade towards the euro area. In Algeria, 
the weight of the euro is nearly as high as that of the US dollar. Other currencies play a 
minor role in the region. For example, the Kuwaiti dinar is possibly used to target investors 
in the Gulf region.
(c)  Maturity of public debt. A high share of short-term liabilities increases vulnerability as a 
large proportion of debt needs to be rolled over in a short period of time and is thus 
sensitive to increases in interest rates. As for external debt, short-term liabilities are either 
negligible (Algeria, Egypt and Israel) or non-existent (Morocco and Jordan). As for 
domestic debt, the share of short-term obligations tends to increase, but remains below 
20% for all countries except Egypt, where it stands at 24%. Lebanon is a peculiar case as 
the maturity of total domestic debt is equal to (or less than) five years, posing a serious 
problem in terms of costs of funding and rollover requirements.
(d)  Fixed rate versus floating rate debt. Although consistent data are available only for a few 
countries, it appears that fixed rate liabilities play a prominent role both in the domestic 
and external debt, for example in the case of Egypt and Israel. 
(e)  Loans versus securities. In Israel, Lebanon and Morocco the securities component is 
prevalent, while the share of loans is more significant in Algeria and Egypt or even 
dominant in Jordan and Syria. To some extent, this feature can be interpreted as a proxy 
for the degree of development of domestic financial markets, as more efficient and well-
functioning financial markets are usually associated with a higher share of issued securities 
than loans.
Chart B Rating history downgrades
(Standard & Poor’s ratings)
Chart A Rating history upgrades
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In the presence of these fiscal vulnerabilities, 
monetary policy is confronted with the risk of 
adverse macroeconomic and fiscal developments 
which could interfere with monetary policy 
objectives and potentially undermine 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Adverse 
fiscal developments, whether triggered by 
policy slippage or external shocks, can rapidly 
raise doubts about debt sustainability. These 
could then lead to an increase in interest rates/
sovereign spreads and inflation expectations, to 
downward pressure on the exchange rate, and 
ultimately to higher inflation. In countries with 
exchange rate pegs, the credibility of the 
external anchor may be undermined.
While there are currently no immediate concerns 
about debt sustainability in the region, with the 
exception of Lebanon, and no case of extreme 
fiscal dominance of monetary policy is 
observable (such as experienced for example in 
Turkey after the crisis of 2000-01; see Box 4), 
continued vulnerability implies that monetary 
policy is conducted in the shadow of fiscal 
problems. In such an environment, central 
banks face the risk of being pressured into 
accommodating fiscal policies, thereby reducing 
emphasis on keeping inflation in check. Indeed, 
empirical evidence indicates that the response 
of interest rates to inflation in emerging market 
economies weakens with debt-to-GDP and 
external debt-to-GDP ratios: the higher the debt 
ratios, the lower the response. This tends to 
Table 13 Assets in Mediterranean central banks’ balance sheets (2004)
(% of total assets)
Euro area MED total AL EG IS JO LE MO SY TU
Assets
  Lending to banks 39 4002757 1 65
  Net foreign assets 38 62 94 7 90 82 60 84 15 74
  Lending to the government 5 26 6 78 3 11 35 5 35 11
  Other domestic assets 18 8 1 16 4 0 -1 4 34 10
Memorandum:
Total assets as % of GDP 11 40 48 34 25 71 115 35 76 15
Sources: National central banks, ECB. 
Notes: Average monthly data (end of month), annual data for Morocco and Tunisia, quarterly data for Syria, no data for Libya.  
support the view that higher levels of public 
debt may end up constraining the response of 
central banks to changes in inflationary 
pressure.24
The direct role of central banks in the region in 
financing budget deficits has diminished over 
the last decades, also as a result of the 
strengthening of monetary frameworks. In 
some countries, central bank credit to the 
government is legally forbidden (e.g. in Israel, 
where in 1985 the so-called “no printing law” 
was enacted), while most central bank laws 
limit credit to the government to overdrafts. 
Nevertheless, lending to the government is 
a significant item in some Mediterranean 
countries’ central bank balance sheets 
(see Table 13).
Overall, government lending accounts for 26% 
of assets on the central banks’ balance sheets in 
Mediterranean countries.25 The central banks 
of Egypt, Lebanon and Syria stand out as 
significant net lenders to the government, which 
as in the case of Egypt may reflect high lending 
in the past and does not necessarily point to the 
provision of credit to the government in recent 
24  See Baig, Kumar, Vasishtha and Zoli (2006).
25  In the euro area, the comparable figure stands at 5%, as the EC 
Treaty and the independence of the Eurosystem central banks 
prohibit granting further credit to the government.
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times. In the other countries the share is much 
lower. In the absence of clear legal provisions 
ruling out central bank lending to the 
government, the existence of fiscal 
vulnerabilities implies that, in a situation of 
fiscal stress, governments may put pressure on 
the central bank to finance public deficits, to 
the detriment of monetary policy objectives. 
This may all the more be the case when access 
to international financial markets is difficult, 
when domestic financial markets are less 
developed and when fiscal rigidities complicate 
budgetary adjustments (see Sub-section 4.2).
Box 4
FISCAL DOMINANCE OF MONETARY POLICY: THE CASE OF TURKEY1
The case of Turkey before and in the aftermath of the 2000-01 financial crisis embodies 
interesting lessons for the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in emerging market 
economies with high public debt. Turkey has been characterised for decades by high inflation 
(on average 40% p.a. in the four decades preceding the crisis). A major cause for high inflation 
was undisciplined fiscal policy, with high deficits being partially monetised by the central 
bank. The crisis in 2000-01 led to a sharp increase in net public debt (from 58% of GDP in 2000 
to 91% of GDP in 2001) as a result of (i) a devaluation of the Turkish lira (Turkey was forced 
to abandon a crawling peg to a basket that was introduced in 1999 in an attempt of macroeconomic 
stabilisation), which increased external and foreign currency-denominated domestic debt, 
(ii) the restructuring of the banking sector (i.e. previous contingent liabilities became public 
debt), and (iii) the recession following the crisis. The average maturity of domestic public 
borrowing in 2002 had fallen to nine months and more than half of the debt stock was either 
indexed in some form or denominated in foreign currency; domestic interest rates and bond 
spreads increased sharply, reflecting concerns about debt sustainability.
Following the crisis, fiscal policy was significantly tightened, with primary surpluses of 6.5% 
of GNP set as targets in the IMF program. Monetary policy was geared towards an internal 
anchor in a strategy called “implicit inflation targeting” pursued by the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT), before introducing a formal inflation targeting regime in 2006. 
Moreover, a new central bank law was adopted in 2001 immediately after the crisis, granting 
the CBRT a relatively high degree of independence and forbidding lending to the government. 
Subsequently, Turkey embarked on a rapid disinflation process, with inflation falling from 54% 
in 2001 to 25% in 2003 before stabilising at around 10% since 2004. At the same time, Turkey 
recorded strong growth, averaging 7.5% p.a. in 2002-05.
Notwithstanding the strengthening of the monetary framework, enhanced fiscal discipline and 
a rapid disinflation process, the concerns about debt sustainability cast a shadow over monetary 
policy in the aftermath of the crisis. The ability of the CBRT to raise interest rates was effectively 
constrained under the prevailing circumstances at that time: higher interest rates would 
immediately increase public borrowing costs, given the short maturities of government debt, 
and thus would exacerbate doubts about debt sustainability. This in turn would lead to capital 
outflows and a depreciation of the currency, thus further increasing external debt and fuelling 
inflation, given that the exchange rate pass-through was very high. Accordingly the central 
1 See Emir, Özatay and Şahinbeyoğlu (2004), Celasun, Gelos and Prati (2004), Özatay (2005) and Kara (2006).31
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bank was faced with a “perverse” transmission channel of monetary policy in the shadow of 
high public indebtedness and concerns about debt sustainability: increasing interest rates to 
counter inflationary pressure would “backfire” and lead to higher inflation via the exchange 
rate channel. Put in different words: under these circumstances inflation targeting is asymmetric; 
cutting policy rates is not a problem, while raising them is.2 
The case of Turkey contains at least five lessons with regard to the interaction of fiscal and 
monetary policy:
1.  Undisciplined fiscal policy and the monetisation of public deficits was a key factor for 
Turkey’s chronically high inflation rate prior to the successful macroeconomic stabilisation 
after the 2000-01 crisis.
2.  Given this track record, fiscal variables such as the primary surplus and the debt burden and 
expectations regarding fiscal policy were key to forming inflation expectations in Turkey.
3.  Against this background, enhanced fiscal discipline was the major anchor of the disinflation 
process in Turkey, alongside a strengthened monetary policy framework lending credibility 
to the CBRT.
4. Notwithstanding significant fiscal tightening and enhanced central bank credibility, 
monetary policy was constrained by concerns about debt sustainability and could not use 
its instruments in the same way as a central bank not operating in the shadow of public 
(over-)indebtedness. This has been one of the key reasons why the CBRT operated under 
an “implicit” inflation targeting regime in the initial years after the crisis and refrained from 
moving to a fully-fledged inflation targeting framework until fiscal dominance had 
receded.
5.  Turkey’s record over the last five years is an example of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
policy. Rapid disinflation and tight fiscal policies were accompanied by buoyant economic 
growth. Actually, fiscal discipline was a precondition for growth, given that any relaxation 
of fiscal policy would have translated into higher (nominal and real) interest rates in view 
of the concerns about debt sustainability and the significance of fiscal variables for inflation 
expectations.
2  See Blanchard (2004) who analyses a similar situation for Brazil in 2002-03 and uses a formal model demonstrating that raising 
interest rates against inflation pressures can “backfire” when debt sustainability is at risk, as rising interest rates increase the default 
risk and lead to capital outflows, and thus to a depreciating currency, which in turn causes inflation to increase, in particular when 
exchange rate pass-through is high.
4.1.2 OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES: 
VULNERABILITIES RESULTING FROM 
DEPENDENCE ON HYDROCARBON REVENUE
Fiscal vulnerabilities and their potential impact 
on monetary policy in oil-producing 
Mediterranean countries are of a different 
nature than in non-oil-producing countries (see 
also Box 1 in Section 3). Given that public debt 
has recently been significantly reduced in 
Algeria and eliminated in Libya, these two 
countries have more room for manoeuvre and 
are in a much better position to cope with 
potential shocks. Because of their high 
dependency on hydrocarbon revenues, their 
main source of vulnerability is a sharp fall in 
hydrocarbon prices. Non-hydrocarbon deficits 
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are still high (e.g. around 30% of non-
hydrocarbon GDP in Algeria) and point to the 
need to develop alternative sources of 
government revenue. This is particularly 
relevant for Syria, which faces dwindling oil 
reserves and where oil-related revenues are 
projected to fall by half over the next ten years. 
The country is even expected to become a net 
oil importer by the end of this decade. As Syria 
has not accumulated financial assets, there is a 
pressing need for a major fiscal adjustment, 
both on the expenditure side, in particular by 
cutting oil subsidies, which currently account 
for more than 10% of GDP, and on the revenue 
side, by developing alternative sources of 
revenues (e.g. by the introduction of VAT). 
Otherwise, the country could face severe fiscal 
pressure in the near future, which could 
jeopardise macroeconomic stability.
Managing large fiscal surpluses resulting from 
high oil prices poses some challenges of its own 
for monetary policy. In Algeria, for example, 
the banking sector is characterised by surplus 
liquidity originating from high hydrocarbon 
revenues. While tariff cuts and good harvests 
have so far helped to keep inflation in check, 
M2 growth appears relatively high, driven by a 
rapid build-up of net foreign assets, and the 
central bank has been struggling to sterilise 
liquidity. To reduce the impact of oil price 
fluctuations on monetary growth, oil receipts 
would need to be kept out of the domestic 
banking system, e.g. by depositing them in a 
special account with the central bank or a 
separate oil fund. Moreover, in economies with 
limited absorption capacity, a massive increase 
in public expenditure, as currently planned in 
Algeria, needs to be carefully implemented in 
order to avoid inflationary pressure.
4.2   IMPLICATIONS OF SPECIFIC REVENUE AND 
EXPENDITURE FEATURES FOR MONETARY 
POLICY
Apart from the vulnerabilities stemming from 
high deficits and debt levels and, for oil 
producers, from a high dependence on 
hydrocarbon revenue, some of the specific 
features of Mediterranean countries’ budgets as 
identified in Section 3 may have implications 
for monetary policy. 
An important issue in this context is the large 
role of subsidies (and regulated prices) in many 
countries’ budgets, in particular with regard to 
food items and oil products. From a fiscal, a 
distributional and an allocation perspective, a 
reduction and final elimination of subsidies and 
a liberalisation of prices would be warranted. 
However, phasing out subsidies and liberalising 
prices inevitably exerts upward pressure on 
prices. Given the magnitude of subsidies in 
many countries of the region, the potential for 
price increases as a result of cuts in subsidies is 
significant. This is illustrated by the recent 
reduction in subsidies in Jordan, where inflation 
increased from 3.5% in 2005 to 6.3% in 2006. 
This inflationary pressure is mainly a result of 
cuts in oil subsidies, which were urgently 
needed in view of their rising budgetary cost. In 
Syria, this could also become an important 
issue in the near term, as declining oil revenues 
may – and should – lead to a reduction in 
subsidies and to the introduction of VAT, as 
recommended e.g. by the IMF. There is a broad 
consensus that the direct impact (or first-round 
effects) on inflation are inevitable and should 
not necessarily be counteracted by a monetary 
tightening. However, central banks need to 
remain vigilant and ensure that the initial spike 
in the price level does not translate into a 
deterioration of inflation expectations and 
second-round effects, e.g. with regard to wage 
developments. Against this background, the 
timing of decisions on a reduction in subsidies 
and on the liberalisation of prices appears to be 
important, and a consultation with the central 
bank may be useful in order to ensure that 
inflation expectations remain well-anchored 
and second-round effects are avoided.26
The relatively limited role that automatic 
stabilisers tend to play in most Mediterranean 
countries in addressing cyclical developments 
26  The issue of the impact of administered price adjustments on 
inflation is equally relevant for Mediterranean and transition 
countries.33
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might be another issue of concern for monetary 
policy. Automatic or built-in stabilisers in the 
budget mainly work via taxes, in particular 
direct taxes, and transfers related to 
unemployment and other income support 
schemes, which are sensitive to cyclical 
developments. In most countries of the region, 
in particular direct taxation and transfers play a 
much more limited role than for example in EU 
countries. As a result, automatic stabilisers can 
be expected to be relatively weak. In the face of 
cyclical fluctuations this leaves countries with 
two policy options: (i) to resort to discretionary 
fiscal policies for stabilisation purposes, which 
pose severe problems of their own; or (ii) to 
assign a more active role to monetary policy, 
which again is problematic, inter alia as it may 
at times conflict with price stability as the 
primary objective of monetary policy. The latter 
is not even an option for those countries having 
a fixed exchange rate. In view of the weak 
automatic stabilisers and the difficulties 
inherent in active stabilisation policies, 
countries might ultimately have to refrain from 
any stabilisation policies and accept even large 
fluctuations of output. For example, large 
output fluctuations in Morocco, triggered by 
the volatility of agricultural output, could be 
seen as an expression of this dilemma with 
regard to stabilisation policy.
The prevalence of fiscal rigidities in the budget 
structure of many countries (due to the relatively 
high share of “pre-committed” spending outlays 
such as interest payments and wages and 
salaries, and difficulties to raise higher tax 
revenues; see Section 3) also hampers the 
implementation of discretionary fiscal 
adjustments for stabilisation purposes. 
In a similar vein, low budgetary flexibility, 
resulting from both difficulties to raise revenues 
and to cut expenditure, leaves relatively little 
room for fiscal policy to react to external shocks 
or to address new spending priorities. It makes 
the option of tightening fiscal policy more 
complicated, if such an adjustment is needed to 
address widening external imbalances, as is 
currently the case, e.g. in Jordan. The relatively 
low degree of budgetary flexibility may lead to 
calls for a more active role of monetary policy 
and possibly pressure on central banks.
4.3  THE ROLE OF FISCAL RULES
Many countries – in the Mediterranean region 
and elsewhere – find it difficult to consolidate 
their budget and pursue sound fiscal policies 
notwithstanding the well-known negative 
consequences of high fiscal deficits. This is 
primarily the result of political economy 
factors. Governments have a tendency to 
finance public expenditure via debt issuance to 
a greater extent than is warranted from a purely 
economic point of view.27 This leaning towards 
excessive public deficits is due to the 
intertemporal redistribution involved in deficit 
financing, which shifts part of the fiscal burden 
from present to future generations. A large body 
of economic literature has provided theoretical 
and empirical evidence for this bias in favour 
of deficit financing.28
The experience with the “deficit bias” driven 
by political economy factors has drawn attention 
to fiscal rules as a possible remedy. Two types 
of rules can be distinguished:
(i) quantitative (numerical) fiscal rules. Such 
rules provide numerical benchmarks for one 
or more key parameters of fiscal policy. 
They aim at limiting political discretion and 
27 Financing public investment, tax smoothing and smoothing 
business cycles are the major normative arguments proposed by 
economic theory in favour of budget deficits.
28  The seminal contribution on the deficit bias from a political 
economy point of view is that of Buchanan and Wagner (1977). 
Later literature has increasingly looked at specific features of 
democratic systems that are particularly conducive to excessive 
deficits, such as individual election systems and the degree of 
political polarisation, etc. (see, for instance, Roubini and Sachs 
(1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Corsetti and 
Roubini (1993) and Alesina and Perotti (1995)). For a recent 
overview of the literature, see Schuknecht (2004). Most of this 
literature concerns countries with democratic political systems, 
where elections, and the efforts of competing parties to win 
electoral support through expenditure-enhancing or revenue-
reducing fiscal measures, are the driving force behind the deficit 
bias. Much less is known about the political economy with 
regard to public deficits in political systems where elections are 
not the ultimate source of political power and legitimacy. While 
this topic would deserve further research, there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that also in such systems persistent and high 
fiscal deficits are mainly driven by political economy factors.
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can act as a commitment device to prevent 
short-sighted political considerations 
leading to excessive spending and deficits; 
and
(ii) procedural or institutional fiscal rules. Such 
rules may be conducive to fiscal discipline 
by improving budgetary institutions and 
management. For instance, the control of 
the Treasury over the budgetary process 
could be enhanced, the role of the finance 
minister within the government strengthened, 
or independent fiscal councils established to 
play a role in fiscal policy. Quantitative and 
procedural fiscal rules can to a certain extent 
be substitutes.29 At the same time, sound 
budgetary institutions and procedural rules 
facilitate the implementation of quantitative 
rules and may thus also be complementary.
Fiscal transparency and medium-term fiscal 
frameworks can be seen as prerequisites for 
both quantitative and procedural rules to be 
effective. This encompasses broad coverage 
of fiscal reporting and adopting a forward-
looking approach to budget formulation, e.g. 
via multi-year budgets, based on reasonable 
macroeconomic assumptions. These elements 
combined create a more predictable fiscal 
environment and increase the accountability of 
fiscal policy-makers. More transparency and 
accuracy in fiscal reporting, a comprehensive 
coverage of the public sector and a medium-
term-oriented fiscal policy are clearly in the 
interest of the central bank, which needs to take 
into account the current and expected fiscal 
stance when formulating monetary policy. 
Fiscal rules are not a panacea and involve many 
problems of their own. These include 
appropriately balancing simplicity and 
transparency on the one hand against flexibility 
and room for discretion on the other, ensuring 
effective enforcement and avoiding incentives 
for creative accounting to artificially meet 
numerical targets. However, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that carefully designed fiscal 
rules can constitute a useful device to foster 
fiscal discipline. Indeed, over the last decade, 
many countries have adopted some sort of fiscal 
rule.30
In the Mediterranean region, fiscal rules are not 
widespread at present despite the vulnerabilities 
stemming from fiscal policy as identified above. 
Very few countries are using quantitative targets 
for key fiscal indicators over a medium-term 
horizon. Israel is the sole country which has 
recently moved to a more rule-based fiscal 
policy. The Deficit Reduction Law (DRL), as 
amended in 2004, limits the annual increase in 
central government real expenditure to 1% and 
the budget deficit to 3% of GDP.31 Jordan and 
Tunisia have no fully-fledged fiscal rules, but 
they adopted medium-term targets to reduce 
public debt-to-GDP ratios (Jordan: to 60% by 
2010; Tunisia: to 45% by 2011). In the same 
vein, Egypt mapped out a multi-year 
consolidation plan designed to reduce the 
deficit by more than 1% of GDP annually over 
the next four years to 3-4% of GDP. Among oil-
producing countries, only Algeria has some 
elements of a rule-based policy, by transferring 
those hydrocarbon revenues that are generated 
if oil prices are above USD 19 per barrel to the 
stabilisation fund. As regards procedural rules, 
the institutional strength of the finance minister 
in the preparation and execution of the budget 
29  Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2004) refer to procedural 
rules as a “delegation” approach to fiscal governance, where 
significant strategic powers are delegated to a decision-maker 
who is less bound to special interests, typically the finance 
minister. By contrast, quantitative rules are consistent with a 
“contract” approach, where parties involved in the budgetary 
process agree on and later on respect a set of key budgetary 
parameters. Which of the two approaches is more appropriate 
depends on key characteristics of the political process in a 
country.
30  The most prominent example is the EU’s Stability and Growth 
Pact. In the United Kingdom, budgetary policy is subject to the 
so-called golden rule, which limits deficits over the economic 
cycle to capital expenditure. Several countries, such as New 
Zealand and Australia, have adopted fiscal responsibility laws 
that typically combine procedural rules with quantitative rules.
31  The 2004 amendment of the DRL came after this law, enacted 
in 1991, was seen as little successful in controlling fiscal 
outcomes on a multi-year basis and anchoring fiscal policy; see 
Flug (2006). The ceiling for the annual increase of real 
expenditure has recently been lifted from 1% to 1.7% from 2007 
onwards, as 1% was considered as overly tight, also in view of 
the demographic development. It is too early to judge the extent 
to which the 2004 move to a more rule-based policy has been 
conducive to more fiscal discipline in Israel. 35
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32  See Barnett and Ossowski (2002) on the non-oil budget balance/
non-oil GDP ratio as a fiscal indicator in oil-producing 
countries. See Sturm and Siegfried (2005) for a discussion on 
fiscal rules in oil-dependent countries in the Gulf region.
and in effectively controlling all public 
expenditure seems to differ among countries.
One of the reasons for the limited role of fiscal 
rules in the region may be relatively low 
fiscal transparency (see Sub-section 2.5). A 
high degree of fiscal transparency is a 
necessary – albeit not sufficient – prerequisite 
for effective implementation of fiscal rules. 
Accordingly, transparency and data quality 
would need to be improved in most countries 
before a fiscal rule could become a meaningful 
device to guide fiscal policy.
Furthermore, the specific challenges for fiscal 
policy in oil-dominated economies (see Box 1) 
have to be taken into account when formulating 
fiscal rules in oil-producing countries. This 
applies in particular to the choice of appropriate 
fiscal indicators in the design of quantitative 
fiscal rules. For instance, the overall deficit, 
and thus the deficit-to-GDP ratio, has to be 
interpreted with even greater caution than in 
non-oil economies, and cannot be considered a 
reliable indicator of the fiscal stance. For 
example, in a period of rising oil prices the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio may decline in spite of 
expansionary fiscal policies featuring 
expenditure increases or a reduction in non-oil 
revenue. Higher oil revenues (and higher oil 
GDP) would conceal fiscal expansion. 
Conversely, in a period of falling oil prices, the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio may rise in spite of 
budgetary consolidation in the form of 
expenditure reductions and an increase in non-
oil revenue. An assessment of the underlying 
fiscal policy stance on the basis of the overall 
deficit could therefore be misleading; and a 
fiscal rule based on an unqualified deficit-to-
GDP ratio could even exacerbate and 
institutionally enshrine pro-cyclical behaviour, 
a major problem of public finances in oil 
economies. Thus, other indicators insulating 
the budget balance from oil price developments 
appear more appropriate as a basis for numerical 
fiscal rules in oil-producing countries, in 
particular the non-oil budget balance/non-oil 
GDP ratio.32
Central banks have much to gain from effective 
fiscal rules, notably in the Mediterranean 
region. This applies to both non-oil-producing 
countries, given the pressing need for budget 
consolidation in many of them, and to oil-
producing countries, given revenue volatility 
and intergenerational equity issues. Anchoring 
fiscal policy by using an effective fiscal rule 
may not only be conducive to reducing fiscal 
deficits but can also help to make fiscal policy 
more predictable. Central banks face in any 
event many uncertainties when conducting 
monetary policy. Thus, effective fiscal rules 
could help reduce at least to some extent those 
uncertainties stemming from the fiscal sector.
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
High fiscal deficits have characterised the 
economic history of many developed as well as 
developing countries, including in the 
Mediterranean region and in the euro area. 
While Mediterranean countries exhibit some 
specific fiscal features and challenges, they 
also face others that are common to many euro 
area (and other) countries, in particular 
concerning deficits and debt reduction and 
the maintenance of fiscal discipline. The 
consequences of high public deficits for their 
economies have often been harmful. By 
contributing to aggregate demand stimulation, 
high deficits can add to inflationary pressure 
and/or put a strain on the balance of payments. 
If sustained, high deficits can also result in the 
accumulation of large public debts, which 
eventually put pressure on interest rates and/or 
prices, the latter in particular in countries that 
monetise public debt. High and persistent 
deficits often are detrimental to long-term 
growth because they tend to crowd out private 
investment via reduced available resources, and 
higher taxes and/or interest rates. They also 
limit the room to accommodate unexpected 
fiscal shocks and to use fiscal policy for cyclical 
stabilisation purposes. Forced fiscal adjustments 
in the wake of high deficits are often 
implemented mainly at the expense of public 
investment because capital outlays are often 
easiest to cut, also from a political economy 
point of view.
In the Mediterranean region, most countries 
have made some progress in reducing budget 
deficits and public debt, but many still face 
daunting fiscal challenges. This is particularly 
true for countries still exhibiting very high 
deficits and debt levels, for countries facing a 
sharp decrease in foreign grants or for oil-
producing countries facing a depletion of 
reserves. Other specific features of the 
budgetary structure displayed by many countries 
in the region, both on the revenue and the 
expenditure side, also constitute challenges. 
These include the difficulty to generate tax 
revenue, in particular for direct taxes, and 
rigidities on the expenditure side due to the 
high share of wages and salaries, subsidies, 
military spending and interest expenditure. 
Fiscal policy appears to have played a too 
limited role to underpin lasting and sustainable 
macroeconomic stability in the region. Indeed, 
in most countries a shock originating from, or 
being transmitted via and exacerbated by, the 
fiscal sector is the single most important risk 
that could potentially undermine macroeconomic 
stability. This is particularly the case for 
countries combining a high debt level, a high 
share of external debt (or foreign currency-
denominated debt), an open capital account and 
an exchange rate peg, which together increase 
vulnerability. For countries still in the process 
of capital account liberalisation, vulnerability 
may actually increase unless public indebtedness 
is brought down.
Reducing vulnerabilities and fiscally-driven 
threats to macroeconomic stability requires a 
reduction of public indebtedness, encompassing 
contingent liabilities. This can only be achieved 
via the reform of public finances, continued 
fiscal discipline and sustained economic 
growth. Enhancing and maintaining fiscal 
discipline will be facilitated by improving the 
institutional framework in which fiscal policy 
operates, e.g. via more effective budgetary 
management and transparency, and eventually 
via fiscal rules, which so far are not being 
widely used in the region.
From a central bank perspective, fiscal policy 
on the one hand lies outside central banks’ area 
of responsibility, but on the other hand has a 
significant impact on the environment in which 
monetary policy is conducted.
Evidence from both advanced and developing 
economies suggests that a monetary policy 
credibly committed to price stability based on 
a sound monetary framework is the best 
contribution that central banks can make to 
macroeconomic and financial stability, to better 
fiscal outcomes and ultimately to economic 
growth. A monetary policy aimed at achieving 37
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and maintaining price stability, which is fully 
credible in the commitment to this primary 
objective, is conducive to low nominal and real 
interest rates. Lower interest rates alleviate the 
burden of interest expenditure in the budget and 
create room for deficit reduction, more 
productive expenditure or tax reduction. This is 
particularly important in countries with high 
debt levels such as those in the Mediterranean 
region. In addition, such a policy conducted by 
an independent central bank makes it clear 
to fiscal policy-makers that no monetary 
accommodation of unsound fiscal policies can 
be expected. This may, in turn, contribute to 
fiscal discipline. The availability of monetary 
financing of government deficits clearly has the 
opposite effect, and should thus be firmly 
restricted or ideally ruled out.
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ANNEX
SUMMARY OF KEY FISCAL CHARACTERISTICS 
AND CHALLENGES IN MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES – A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY VIEW
ALGERIA
DEBT/DEFICITS
Public debt no longer a major issue as 
significantly reduced recently in the wake of 
high oil prices (2000: 69% of GDP; 2005: 29% 
of GDP). Large budget surpluses recently 
(2005: 14% of GDP), but non-hydrocarbon 
deficit remains high. 
EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
High capital expenditure to upgrade 
infrastructure and high subsidies. Heavy 
reliance on hydrocarbon revenue (2005: 71% of 
total revenue), low tax revenues.
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
Oil stabilisation fund, in which hydrocarbon 
revenues in excess of those budgeted are 
deposited. Relatively low degree of fiscal 
transparency. Sound long-term management of 
hydrocarbon revenue required. High exposure 
to changes in international hydrocarbon prices 
is key risk. Impact of recent expenditure 
increase on inflation to be closely monitored in 




High public debt (2005: 112% of GDP), even 
though net public debt is significantly lower 
than gross debt due to large government deposits 
in the banking sector. High budget deficits 
since 2002 in spite of relatively solid GDP 
growth.
EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
High subsidies notwithstanding recent cuts. 
Relatively low tax revenues by non-oil-
producing countries’ standards. Some 
hydrocarbon revenues.
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
Some progress in fiscal transparency and 
budgetary management in recent years. Fiscal 
consolidation urgent in view of high deficits 
and debt. Contingent liabilities in the banking 
system. Strengthening tax and customs regimes. 
Raising the productivity of expenditure, and 
improving the targeting of pro-poor spending.
ISRAEL
DEBT/DEFICITS
High public debt (2005: 97% of GDP), but on a 
declining path. Budget deficits declining since 
2003 due to solid growth and fiscal 
consolidation.
EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
High expenditure level (at around 50% of GDP, 
high by regional, but also OECD, standards), 
driven by high military and interest expenditure 
and a relatively developed welfare state. 
Developed tax system with highest reliance on 
direct taxes in the region.
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
Recently moved to more rule-based fiscal 
policy (real expenditure increase limited to 
1.7% p.a., ceiling for deficit-to-GDP ratio of 
3%). Fiscal consolidation remains exposed to 
shocks originating in the domestic political 




High public debt (2005: 82% of GDP), which is 
predominantly external, but long-term and 
mainly owed to public creditors. Increased 
deficits after 2002 as a result of high oil prices 
and a reduction in grants, subsequent fiscal 
tightening to contain deficits.39
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EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
High military expenditure, previously high oil 
subsidies to be phased out in 2007. Low direct 
tax revenues. High dependence on foreign 
grants, which recently have declined.
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
High external debt is combined with open 
capital account, fixed exchange rate peg and 
large current account deficit. High implicit 
liabilities in pension system. Exposure to 




Very high public debt (2005: 175% of GDP) 
and fragile debt structure (high share of foreign 
currency-denominated domestic and external 
debt, short/medium-term debt), exacerbated by 
contingent liabilities in pension system. Debt 
sustainability at risk. Continuously high 
deficits, after decline to 8% of GDP in 2005 
expected to rise again as a result of military 
conflict in 2006.
EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
Very high interest payments (2005: 15% of 
GDP, 34% of total expenditure) and high 
expenditure on wages and subsidies. Low tax 
revenues, but relatively high reliance on trade-
related taxes. 
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
Debt sustainability is jeopardised without far-
reaching fiscal reforms and external support/
concessional financing. High foreign currency-
denominated and external debt combined with 
open capital account, exchange rate peg and 
large current account deficit create vulnerability. 
Fiscal reforms difficult due to domestic political 




Public debt has been eliminated in the wake of 
high oil prices. Large budget surpluses (2005: 
32% of GDP), but widening non-hydrocarbon 
deficit.
EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
Large size of public sector. High capital 
expenditure to upgrade infrastructure. Heavy 
reliance on hydrocarbon revenue (2005: 93% of 
total revenue), very low tax revenue, one of two 
countries in the region that do not levy VAT.
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
Oil stabilisation fund, with non-transparent 
features, reflecting the generally very low level 
of fiscal transparency. Strengthening the 
management of oil wealth. High exposure to 
changes in international hydrocarbon prices is 
key risk. Impact of recent expenditure increase 
on inflation to be closely monitored in view of 
limited absorption capacity. 
MOROCCO
DEBT/DEFICITS
Relatively high public debt (2005: 70% of 
GDP) and high budget deficits of 4-6% of GDP 
since 2000, deficits sensitive to GDP growth, 
which in turn depends strongly on agricultural 
output/weather conditions. Share of domestic 
debt in total debt increased over last years, 
now accounting for more than two-thirds of 
total debt.
EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
High expenditure on wages and salaries (>40% 
of total expenditure and 12% of GDP) expected 
to decline with the implementation of the early 
retirement programme for civil servants. 
Expenditure on subsidies lower than in other 
countries of the region. Relatively high tax 
revenues by regional standards.
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OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
High privatisation revenues and improvements 
in fiscal transparency and budgetary 
management over recent years. Reducing 
persistently high deficits, mainly by reining in 
expenditure on wages and salaries, is key 
challenge notwithstanding recent efforts in this 
regard. Implicit liabilities in pension system. 
Tax reform, e.g. simplifying the VAT system.
SYRIA
DEBT/DEFICITS
Public debt stable at around 60% of GDP since 
2000. Budget deficits of above 4% of GDP in 
2004-05 despite high oil prices.
EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
Relatively high capital expenditure and military 
expenditure. Significant hydrocarbon revenues 
(2005: 33% of total revenue), but declining. 
One of two Mediterranean countries which do 
not levy VAT.
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
Depletion of hydrocarbon reserves is key 
challenge which puts sustainability of public 
finances at risk. Diversifying sources of revenue 




Public debt slowly declining (2005: 57% of 
GDP), with more than 60% of total debt being 
external. Deficits hovering around 3% of GDP 
since 2000.
EXPENDITURE/REVENUE
High expenditure on wages and salaries (45% 
of total expenditure and 11% of GDP).   
Relatively high tax revenues by regional 
standards.
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS/KEY CHALLENGES
Reducing high deficits, mainly by reining in 
expenditure on wages and salaries, is key 
challenge. In the longer term, Tunisia will be 
the first country in the region facing the fiscal 
challenges of an ageing population.
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